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FEDERALISM, FREE COMPETITION, AND
SHERMAN ACT PREEMPTION OF STATE
RESTRAINTS
Alan

J.

Meeset

ABSTRACT

The Sherman Act establkshes free competition as the rule governing
interstate trade. Banning private restraints cannot ensure that
competitive markets allocate the nation's resources. State lavs can pose
identical threats to free markets, posing an obstacle to achieving
Congress'sgoalto protectfree competition.
The Sherman Act would thus override anticompetitive state laws under
ordinary preemption standards. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
rejected such preemption in Parkerv. Brown, creating the "state action
doctrine." Parkerand its progeny hold that state-imposed restraintsare
immune from Sherman Act preemption, even if they impose signficant
harm on out-of-state consumers. Parker'sprogeny also immunizes
"hybrid" restraints-pivate agreements that states encourage or
supervzse.
Both the Supreme Court and numerous scholars have invoked
federalksm and state sovereigny tojustfy Parker'sstate action doctrine.
Some suggest that preemption would violate the Constitution. Others
contend that these values manfest themselves as canons of construction
that illuminate the statute's original meaning. According to these
scholars, the Act should not intrude upon traditionalstateprerogatives
unless Congressplainly intended this result.
This article demonstrates thatfederalksm and state sovereigny do not
rebut the strong case for Sherman Act preemption of state-created
restraints. Such preemption would be a garden-variety exercise of
t
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Congress's commerce powver. Moreover, ShermanActpreemption wvould

not intefere with any constitutionally recognized attribute of state
sovereignty.
Turning to canons of construction, the article concludes that such

preemption is so plainly constitutional that the avoidance canon is
inapposite. The federal-state balance and anti-preemption canons do
protect traditional state regulatoy spheres from inadvertent national
intrusion. Neither supports Parker itself, wvhich sustained a regime
that directy burdened interstate commerce and injured out-of-state
consumers. Applkcation of these canons instead reveals that the Court's
invocation offederalksm is selective at best. Indeed, the Court's rejection
of the federal-state balance canon and resulting applkcation of the Act to
localpivate restraints thatproduce no interstate harm created the vey
conflkct betwveen the Sherman Act and local regulation that the state
action doctrinepuports to resolve.
Consistent appl cation of federalksm pincaples bolsters the case for
preemption, albeit n'ithin a much smaller sphere than the Sherman Act
currenty operates. Such considerationscounsel retraction of the scope of
the Act and concomitant allocation to states of exclusive authority over
restraintsthatproduce only intrastateharm. The resulting allocation of
authority over trade restraints wvould nearly eliminate conflkcts betwveen
local regulation and the Sherman Act and restore the unform rule of
free competition that best replkcates the regulatoyframew'ork the 1890
Congress anticpated.

Proponents of Parker wvho see states as

laboratoriesfor economic experimentation should w'elcome such reform,
wvhich wvould ironically result in less preemption of state-created
restraintsand strengthen the institution of competitivefederalksm.
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117

I. THE COMMERCE POWER AND THE SHERMAN ACT:

1890-PRESENT.................................................................................................125
II. PARKER AND ITS PROGENY............................................................................

131

A . Parker v. B ro n ............................................................................................. 13 2
B. Parke'sProgeny: Hybrid and Municipal Restraints..............................139
C. The Federalism and State Sovereignty Rationales for the State Action
Doctrine .................................................................................................... 142

16:115 (2021) Federalism, Competition, and Sherman Act Preemption

117

III. FEDERALISM-BASED OBJECTIONS TO SHERMAN ACT
PREEMPTION ................................................................................................... 147
IV. POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO PREEMPTION ................. 148

A. Does the Commerce Clause Authorize Preemption of State Laws?..149
1. Pre-Wickard Preemption.........................................................................149
2. Post-Wickard Preemption.......................................................................157
B. Limits on Otherwise Valid Congressional Interference with State
Sovereignty................................................................................................159
V. FEDERALISM AS INTERPRETIVE CANON...................................................... 163

A. The Avoidance Canon .............................................................................. 164
B. The Federal-State Balance Canon ........................................................... 165
C. The Anti-Preemption Canon ................................................................... 173
1. Pre-W ickard Preemption.........................................................................174
2. Post-Wickard Preemption.......................................................................177

3. Application of the Anti-Preemption Canon to Truy LocalRestraints...... 178
VI. WHICH CONSISTENCY?.................................................................................. 181
INTRODUCTION

T

.

HE Constitution empowers Congress to "regulate commerce among the
several States."1
For nearly two centuries, the Supreme Court has
defined this authority as the power to "prescribe the rule by which commerce
is to be governed." 2 The Sherman Act exemplifies such regulation, banning
contracts and combinations in restraint of interstate commerce as well as
conduct that "monopolizes" any "part" of such commerce. 3 Over a century
ago, the Supreme Court explained that the Act ensures "the free movement .
of trade in the channels of interstate commerce" by protecting the
"fundamental right of freedom of trade" from unreasonable restraints.4 Such
national regulation, the Court has said, establishes the rule of free competition
to govern interstate commerce and prevents public harm such as reduced
output, higher prices and inferior quality.

2

3
4

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1890).
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911).
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The quintessential unlawful restraint of trade is an agreement between
marketplace rivals that reduces output and increases prices.
However,
banning such private agreements cannot itself ensure that free competition
governs interstate commerce. State laws can also obstruct "free movement"
of trade and restrain such commerce. Absent some limits on such stateimposed restraints, a Sherman Act that bans only private conduct cannot
ensure that free competition is the rule for interstate trade.
When Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890, the Commerce Clause
itself supplied such limits. Numerous decisions in the 1870s and 1880s
created a quasi-statutory regime of implied preemption that protected
interstate commerce from state legislation that interfered with free interstate
trade. 5 These decisions held that Congressional silence with respect to
inherently national subjects of interstate commerce indicated Congress's will
that such subjects be immune from state regulation and thus "free and
untrammeled." 6
According to this jurisprudence, state regulations of
intrastate conduct that directly burdened or obstructed interstate commerce
improperly regulated such commerce, exercising power exclusively granted to
Congress.
During the 1890s, the Court read the direct/indirect standard into the
Sherman Act, holding that the Act banned only those contracts "in restraint
of trade" that also directly burdened interstate commerce. Thus, the Court
said, the Act performed the same role with respect to private agreements as
the doctrine of implied preemption played with respect to state legislation.
Together these two regimes protected free interstate competition from all
threats, public and private. Indeed, the Court had no occasion to consider
whether the Sherman Act invalidated state-imposed restraints, precisely
because the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence did exactly that. At the
same time, both regimes-Commerce Clause and Sherman Act-left states
exclusive authority over local activities that produced no interstate harm and
thus only affected interstate commerce indirectly. Competitive federalism
generated the rules governing such intrastate commerce.
In Wickard v. Filburn, however, the Court jettisoned the direct/indirect
standard and vastly expanded the scope of the commerce power.7 Congress,
the Court held, could reach any activity that induces a "substantial economic
effect" on interstate commerce, even if the activity impacts interstate

s
6

7

See infra 196-206 and accompanying text (describing this jurisprudence).
See eg., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 109-110 (1890).
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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commerce indirectly and thus produces no interstate harm. 8 The Court soon
read the "substantial effects" test into the Sherman Act, holding that the Act
reaches local restraints that produce only intrastate harm, if such restraints
substantially affect interstate commerce.9
This expansion of the commerce power created the potential for
employing the doctrine of quasi-statutory implied preemption to interdict
state legislation that produced exclusively intrastate harm but indirectly
affected interstate commerce. However, the Court coupled this expansion
with a concurrent relaxation of the Commerce Clause constraint on
anticompetitive state regulation. The resulting case law left states free to
impose restraints that directly impacted interstate commerce and injured outof-state consumers.
Not surprisingly, parties injured by state-imposed restraints invoked the
Sherman Act in an effort to interdict such wealth-destroying legislation.
They seemed to have a strong case. After all, ordinary preemption doctrine
invalidates state laws that "pose an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full objectives of Congress." 0 Because state-imposed
restraints interfered with the Congressional goal of ensuring free competition
in interstate commerce, such statutes seemed ripe for preemption.
The Supreme Court considered such arguments in Parker v. Brown."t The
plaintiff claimed that the Sherman Act preempted California's scheme to
reduce the state's raisin output and increase the price of interstate raisin
sales.1 2 The Court unanimously rejected the preemption argument, holding
that the Act does not invalidate restraints imposed by individual states.13
Such state action, the Court said, was immune from the Sherman Act,
regardless of the nature of the restraints or magnitude of their impact on outof-state consumers.1 4 The Court also rejected the plaintiff's Commerce
Clause challenge, despite the scheme's obvious direct impact on interstate
commerce.' 5 As a result, states were now free, as they were not before Parke,
to thwart the central policy of the Sherman Act.

a

Id.

9

Mandevile Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S 219, 229-39 (1948)
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
317 U.S. 341, 344 (1943).
Id. at 348-49.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 351-52.
Id. at 359-68 (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge); see also infra notes 203, 214 and

10
11

12
'3

14
1s

accompanying text (explaining how challenged arrangement directly burdened interstate
commerce).
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The Court has deployed similar logic to immunize certain restraints
imposed by private parties and municipalities acting pursuant to state
authorization. Under current law, states may immunize private restraints if
they clearly articulate their intent to displace competition and, in addition,
actively supervise the outcome, particularly price and output, of such
restraints. 6 The resulting restraints-sometimes called "hybrid restraints"are private conduct that would, but for such immunity, violate the Sherman
Act. Of course, most private restraints enjoy no such immunity, either
because states make no effort to provide it or ban such restraints themselves
under their own antitrust laws. Municipal restraints also avoid preemption so
long as a state satisfies the "clear articulation" requirement.
The Court has repeatedly and unanimously claimed that considerations of
"federalism and state sovereignty" justify state action immunity and thus
counsel against Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed or state-authorized
restraints.
Numerous scholars agree.
In particular, the Court and its
academic defenders claim that applying the Act to state-imposed restraints
would unduly interfere with states' ability to serve as laboratories of
democracy, choosing how to regulate their own economies, contrary to the
principles of federalism. The vast post- Wickard reach of the Sherman Act
reinforces this argument, by facilitating application of the Act to local
restraints-including those imposed by state governments- that produce no
interstate harm. Indeed, aside from Parker itself, all state action controversies
that have reached the Supreme Court, including the Court's most recent
pronouncement on the topic, involve local restraints that produce harm
confined to a single state.' 7
Thus, some have claimed that, given the
expansive scope of the Sherman Act, application of the Act to state-imposed
restraints would implicitly resurrect the Lochner era, during which the Court
invalidated state legislation that unduly restricted private economic autonomy.
The state action doctrine, it is said, leaves regulatory choices over local
economic activity where they belong, with the people's elected representatives
instead of federal judges.
Although the Court decided Parker more than seven decades ago, the
"federalism and state sovereignty" rationale for state action immunity remains
under-theorized. Some academic articulations of this rationale invoke the
Constitution itself, suggesting that preemption of state-imposed restraints
16

See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text (describing case law articulating this

'7

See N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 (2015) (evaluating state-imposed

standard).
restraints governing sale of teeth whitening services in a single state); infra notes 139-40

and accompanying text (discussing North CarobinaDenta).
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would be unconstitutional. Other articulations by the Court and scholars
vaguely invoke "federalism," "state sovereignty," or both, without claiming
that the Constitution prevents Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed
restraints. Some scholars have suggested that Parkerreflects the application
of a federalism canon, albeit without identifying any particular canon. Thus,
objective evaluation of Parke's state action defense requires scholars to
identify the doctrinal vehicles through which federalism and state sovereignty
might influence the meaning of the Act and to determine whether Parkerand
its progeny constitute faithful application of such principles.
This article evaluates and rejects the claim that considerations of
federalism and state sovereignty somehow rebut the strong case for Sherman
Act preemption of state-imposed restraints. Instead, consistent application of
federalism principles bolsters the case for preemption of state-imposed
restraints, like those in Parker, that directly burden interstate commerce and
impose interstate harm. At the same time, considerations of federalism also
counsel retraction of the scope of the Act and concomitant allocation to the
states of exclusive authority over restraints that produce only intrastate harm.
The resulting allocation of authority over trade restraints would nearly
eliminate the potential conflicts between local regulation and the Sherman
Act, conflicts that many claim justify the state action doctrine.
The article identifies two broad categories of arguments that supposedly
support the state action doctrine. First, Parke's proponents could claim that
one or more constitutional doctrines that protect federalism or state
sovereignty somehow prohibit outright Sherman Act preemption of stateimposed restraints.
Second, these proponents could argue that such
considerations find expression in one or more canons of statutory
construction and thereby militate against reading the Sherman Act to preempt
such restraints, despite Congress's admitted authority to do so.
The article evaluates the arguments in each category and finds all such
arguments wanting.
Beginning with the first category, the article
demonstrates that no doctrine of constitutional law requires Parke's state
action doctrine. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that
the Framers and Ratifiers adopted the Commerce Clause precisely because of
their experience with state-imposed restraints that unduly burdened interstate
commerce and imposed harm on out-of-state citizens. According to this
historical account, the Clause was designed to empower Congress to prohibit
such parochial state legislation, thereby removing barriers to a wellfunctioning national market and establishing free trade as the rule governing
interstate commercial activity.
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While affirmative statutory preemption was relatively rare during the
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, the Supreme Court read the
Commerce Clause to authorize implied preemption of otherwise valid state
legislation that directly burdens interstate commerce. Moreover, as the scope
of the power has expanded over the past several decades, Congress has
repeatedly exercised this authority to preempt state laws regulating local
matters in numerous settings. To be sure, independent considerations of
state sovereignty can constrain Congress's exercise of the commerce power.
However, Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed restraints does not
interfere with a state's organization or regulation of itself, officers, or
employees and thus does not interfere with any cognizable aspect of state
sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment, Eleventh Amendment, or
inferred from the structure of the Constitution. Thus, preemption of stateimposed restraints like those challenged in Parkeris a garden-variety exercise
of Congress's commerce power.
To evaluate arguments in the second category, the article identifies three
canons of statutory construction that could serve as vehicles for
implementing concerns regarding federalism and state sovereignty: (1) the
avoidance canon; (2) the federal-state balance canon, and (3) the antipreemption canon. None of these canons, it is shown, supports Parke's state
action doctrine.
The article concludes that Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed
restraints is so plainly constitutional that the avoidance canon is simply
inapposite.
The article then applies the federal-state balance and antipreemption canons. Both canons protect traditional state regulatory spheres
from inadvertent national intrusion, whether by regulation of local private
conduct or preemption of state exercise of historic police powers. Far from
bolstering the state action doctrine, the application of these two canons
reveals that Parke's invocation of federalism and state sovereignty is selective,
purporting to solve a problem that the Court itself created. Consistent
application of these canons and the federalism principles that inform them
actually strengthens the case for Sherman Act preemption, albeit within a
much narrower sphere than the Sherman Act currently operates.
The federal-state balance canon addresses statutory regulation of private
conduct and thus does not speak directly to state action cases such as Parke,
where a state itself displaced free competition.1 8 The canon could, however,
apply to hybrid restraints, private agreements encouraged or enforced by the

18

See infra notes 121-34 and accompanying text (describing three categories of state action
cases).
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state. Academic and judicial proponents of the state action doctrine have
expressed concern about possible Sherman Act preemption of state and
municipal regulation, including hybrid restraints, of local activities that
produce no interstate harm. Such federal oversight, they say, would deprive
state and local governments of their status as laboratories of democracy that
try out novel solutions, such as hybrid restraints, to local problems.
Application of the federal-state balance canon to prevent preemption of laws
authorizing such restraints would apparently vindicate these concerns.
However, such concerns have much wider application than Sherman Act
treatment of state-imposed or state-encouraged restraints. If states are to be
sovereign laboratories that experiment with novel solutions to economic
problems, they must also retain discretion regarding how to regulate all
private restraints-not just hybrid restraints-that produce no interstate
harm. Indeed, principled application of the federal-state balance canon would
have required the Court to reject the post- Wickard expansion of the Sherman
Act to reach allprivate restraints that produce no interstate harm. The Court
instead ignored this canon, vastly expanding the reach of the Act vis a vis
private restraints the state has not authorized.
This expansion raised the prospect of Sherman Act preemption of local
regulation, including regulation authorizing hybrid restraints. Parker and its
progeny thwarted such preemption, protecting-to this extent anywaytraditional state regulatory prerogatives. Consistent application of the federalstate balance canon offers a different and more principled solution, namely,
restoration of the pre- Wickard boundary between state and federal power over
trade restraints and retraction of the scope of the Sherman Act. Such revision
of the boundaries between state and federal authority over such activity
would nearly eliminate the potential clash between the Sherman Act and local
regulation that purportedly induced Parker and its progeny to announce and
maintain the state action doctrine.
States would remain free to act as
laboratories with respect to such restraints, unmolested by the Sherman Act.
Restoration of the original federal-state balance in the antitrust context
would not eliminate the prospect of Sherman Act preemption of stateimposed or state-encouraged restraints.
States could authorize hybrid
restraints that directly burden interstate commerce, thereby injuring out-ofstate consumers.
However, Sherman Act invalidation of such restraints
would in fact protect the original federal-state balance, by interdicting the sort
of direct burdens on interstate commerce preempted by the Court's preWickard Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
The anti-preemption canon fares no better as a justification for the state
action doctrine. To be sure, this canon establishes a presumption against

124

Virginia Law & Business Review

16:115 (2021)

applying federal statutes in a manner that supersedes the exercise of "historic
police powers" over "an area traditionally regulated by the states." However,
this canon would not protect the scheme in Parker itself. The scheme in no
way exercised historic police powers but instead regulated a domaininterstate commerce-over which Congress traditionally possessed exclusive
authority.
California's regulation of the price of interstate raisin sales
produced substantial interstate harm and thus would not have survived the
doctrine of implied preemption in place when Congress enacted the Sherman
Act. Preemption of the Parker scheme would have restored the traditional
federal-state balance, by invalidating self-interested legislation that directly
burdened interstate commerce and imposed substantial harm on out-of-state
citizens.
What, though, about Parker-like regulation that produces only intrastate
harm? Sherman Act preemption of such restraints would certainly interfere
with the exercise of historic police powers. Here again, however, application
of the anti-preemption canon would solve a problem the Court itself created
when it ignored the federal-state balance canon and applied the Sherman Act
to private restraints that produced no interstate harm. As noted above,
however, principled application of federalism concerns as reflected in the
federal-state balance canon would preclude application of the Sherman Act to
such restraints-public or private. Restoration of the Sherman Act to its
original and more limited scope would eliminate the putative conflict between
federal antitrust law and local regulation producing no interstate harm and
thus obviate any need to apply the anti-preemption canon.
Application of both federalism canons reveals that federalism in this
Consistent regard for
context should be an all-or-nothing proposition.
federalism requires uniform treatment of private contracts "in restraint of
trade" and state-imposed restraints that produce the same results. There are
two possible forms of consistent treatment: (1) invalidation of all such local
restraints, public or private, "across the board," or (2) reducing the scope of
the Sherman Act, so that the Act only reaches those restraints-public or
private-that produce interstate harm.
Recognition that the Court's Sherman Act jurisprudence reflects
inconsistent regard for federalism does not itself reveal which consistent
approach the Court should take. The article ends by identifying several
considerations suggesting that the Court should resolve the modern
inconsistency in favor of federalism. Consistent reduction in the scope of the
Sherman Act would produce a regime governing interstate commerce that
best replicates the regulatory framework that the 1890 Congress-jealous to
protect free competition from all threats-anticipated. Proponents of Parker
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who see states as laboratories for economic experimentation should welcome
such reform, which, ironically, would result in less preemption of statecreated restraints than current law.
Part I of this article reviews the content and scope of the Sherman Act
during the pre- Wickard era, when the Supreme Court enforced meaningful
limits on the scope of the commerce power and the Sherman Act. Part II
describes the facts and holding of Parker as well as subsequent decisions
elaborating on the scope of state action immunity. This part also details the
considerations of federalism and state sovereignty that both the Court and
academic proponents of Parkerhave invoked. Part III reviews the federalismbased objections to Sherman Act preemption that several scholars have
raised. Part IV evaluates and rejects the constitutional arguments against such
preemption.
Part V evaluates and rejects claims that certain canons of
statutory construction counsel in favor of Parke's state action immunity.
This part concludes that Parkerand its progeny rest on a selective respect for
federalism and concludes that a principled Sherman Act jurisprudence would
Part VI briefly
consistently enforce or ignore federalism considerations.
contends that the Court should resolve modern doctrinal inconsistency in
favor of federalism and reform the scope of the Sherman Act accordingly.
I. THE COMMERCE POWER AND THE SHERMAN ACT: 1890-PRESENT
Passed in 1890, Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids "contract[s],
combination[s] . . . and conspiracy[ies] in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States ... "19 Section 2 prohibits monopolization of any
"part of the trade or commerce among the several States." 20 Each Sherman
Act controversy thus requires courts to resolve two questions. Under Section
1, courts must ask: (1) Is the challenged agreement "in restraint of trade" and
(2) does the agreement also restrain "commerce among the several States." 2 1
Under Section 2, courts must ask: (1) does the challenged conduct
"monopolize" a relevant market and (2) is that monopolized market "part of
the trade or commerce among the several States." 2 2
19
20
21

15 U.S.C. § 1(1890).
15 U.S.C. §2 (1890).

See Apex

Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1940) ("[T]he phrase 'restraint of trade'
. . was made the means of defining the activities prohibited. The addition of the words
'or commerce among the several States' . . . was the means used to relate the prohibited

restraint of trade to interstate commerce for constitutional purposes.").
22

Cf United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 7, 17 (1895) (holding that merger to
monopoly did not contravene Section 2 because monopolizing the relevant market only

affected interstate commerce "indirectly").
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The Sherman Act was an exercise of the commerce power, and Congress
drafted the Act against the backdrop of a well-developed jurisprudence
defining the scope and nature of that authority. 23 While Congress rarely
exercised this power before 1890, the Supreme Court had enforced what
became known as the "dormant" Commerce Clause.24
The Court
constructed a quasi-statutory framework that invalidated all state legislation
that regulated "inherently national" subjects of interstate commerce, even
absent Congressional action.2 s These decisions inferred from Congressional
silence that Congress intended that such subjects be "free and untrammeled"
from state regulation.2 6
State legislation "regulated" such commerce and thus exercised an
exclusive power of Congress if it imposed a "direct burden" on such
commerce.2 7 Impacts were "direct" if they imposed economic harm on
citizens in other states, raising the prospect that state regulation would
produce self-interested results.2 8 Legislation that impacted such commerce
only "indirectly" exceeded the scope of the commerce power and thus
survived this regime.2 9 The result was the allocation of regulatory authority
into mutually exclusive spheres, enforced by a doctrine of implied preemption
that invalidated state enactments exercising authority reserved for Congress.3 o

23

24

Id. at 11-16 (holding that Congress designed the Sherman Act in light of the Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987). The phrase
"dormant Commerce Clause" first appeared in a dissenting opinion. See Hill v. Florida ex
rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 547 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Previously, the Court
had occasionally referred to the commerce power as "dormant," without referencing a
"dormant Commerce Clause." See, eg, Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S.
245, 252 (1829) (referring to "the power to regulate commerce in its dormant State").

2s
26

27

See Barry Cushman, Formalism and &ealism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CH1. L.
REV. 1089, 1092 (2000).
See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
Cushman, supra note 25, at 1101-14; see also Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 329-30
(1890) (invalidating state law banning sale of meat not inspected in the state before

slaughter); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 109 (1890); Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry.
Co., 125 U.S. 465, 482 (1888); infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text) (describing
development of Commerce Clause doctrine distinguishing direct from indirect impacts on
interstate commerce).
28
29

30

Barber, 136 U.S. at 322; Bowman, 125 U.S. at 481-82; Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
See Cushman, supra note 25, at 1101-14; see also Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1888)
(holding that Commerce Clause does not invalidate state laws impacting interstate trade
"indirectly").
See infra notes 194-210.
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The Court's earliest Sherman Act decisions drew upon this jurisprudence
to answer both questions necessary to resolve Sherman Act controversies. 3 1
Agreements were "in restraint of trade" if they directly impacted commerce
by producing supracompetitive prices. 32 Such agreements only restrained
"commerce among the several States" if these direct impacts injured out-ofstate consumers.3 3 Indeed, in Addyston Pjpe & Steel Co. v. United States, the
Court opined that the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to regulate
private agreements producing such direct effects because these restraints
produced the same impact on interstate commerce as analogous stateimposed restraints deemed invalid under the Court's Commerce Clause
precedents .3
In 1911, the Court famously reformulated its interpretation of "restraint
of trade," in Standard Oil v. United States.35 There the Court held that the
Sherman Act only reaches agreements or conduct that restrain trade
"unreasonably." 36 Soon thereafter, the Court announced that this same
standard governed Section 2 analysis. 37 Although a different verbal
formulation, this Rule of Reason, like the direct/indirect standard, focused on
the propensity of a restraint or conduct to produce monopoly or the
consequences of monopoly, namely, higher prices, reduced output, or inferior
quality. 38 However, the Court retained the direct/indirect standard for
31

See United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 11-18 (1895) (holding that Act did not reach

32

mergers to monopoly as such mergers were indirect restraints within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the states).
See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 235-38 (1899) (invoking
findings that restraints produced anticompetitive prices to support holding that impact

was direct); see also United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505, 569-73 (1898)
(holding that agreements "directly" impacted commerce because state-conferred
advantages protected incumbent railroads from competition); United States v. Hopkins,

33

34

171 U.S. 578, 595-96 (1898) (holding that challenged restraints were indirect because they
did not produce "exorbitant charges" for interstate transactions).
See Addyston Ppte, 175 U.S. at 235, 247 (holding that Congress could not reach commerce
"wholly within a state," and thus lacked authorinty over intrastate cartels); see also Alan J.
Meese, Antitrust Regulation and the Federal-State Baance: Restoring the OriginalDesign, 70 AM. U.
L. REV. 75, 123-35 (2020) (discussing how Adyston Ppte and other decisions defined
"restraint of commerce among the several States" to include only those agreements that
produced interstate harm).
Addyston Pite, 175 U.S. at 229-30 (explaining that "private contracts may in truth be as farreaching in their effect upon interstate commerce as would the legislation of a single state
of the same character.").

3s
36

37
38

Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 49-69 (1911).
Id. at 62 (articulating Rule of Reason under Section 1).
See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 177-84 (1911).
See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 61 (defining 'restraint of trade" as "undue restraint of the
course of trade" which brings about monopoly or "the same result as monopoly"); id at
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answering the second question posed in Sherman Act controversies, that is,
whether a contract in restraint of trade or monopolistic conduct also
restrained "commerce among the several States" or monopolized any "part"
of "trade or commerce among the several States." 39 Thus, the Act reached
only those unreasonable restraints or monopolistic conduct that also directly
burdened interstate commerce by exercising market power to the detriment
of out-of-state consumers.40
By 1911, then, the Rule of Reason, combined with the direct/standard
governing the Act's scope, protected "the free movement of trade . . . in the
channels of interstate commerce"41 or, as the Court soon put it, "free
competition in interstate commerce," from private restraints.4 2 At the same
time, the Court's quasi-statutory Commerce Clause jurisprudence invalidated
state legislation that imposed "direct burdens" on interstate commerce. 43
This coherent legal regime protected free interstate trade from threats posed
by the self-interested public and private actors. 44 Implementation of each
regime required the Court to ask the same economic question when applying
the direct/indirect standard, vi ., did the challenged private conduct or
legislation directly obstruct or burden interstate commerce. This regime left
states and private parties free to adopt regulations or restraints that imposed

52 (listing "evils" of monopoly as: (1) the power to fix prices; (2) the power to limit
output and; (3) reduced quality of the monopolized product); see also Alan J. Meese, Price

39

Theoy, Competition and the Rule of Reason, 2003 ILL. L. REV. 77, 87-89 (describing this aspect
of Standard Oils Rule of Reason).
See Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933) (strikes aimed at local
builders exceeded commerce power and Sherman Act even though they reduced steel
purchases from other states); Indus. Ass'n of S.F. v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 80 (1925)

(challenged restraint was intrastate because it did not limit "the freedom of the [out-ofstate] manufacturer to sell and ship or of the local contractor to buy.'"; United Leather

Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 464-72 (1924) (declining to apply
Act to union boycott of trunk manufacturers selling most of their output in interstate
commerce); United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 541-44 (1913) (finding that intrastate
restraint cornering New York cotton exchange directly impacted interstate cotton prices);
Meese, supranote 33, at 88-91 (collecting and discussing additional cases).

41
42

See Meese, supranote 33, at 86-88.
See Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 180.
See Am. Column Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 400-401 (1921) (collecting

4s

decisions holding that "the purpose of the statute is to maintain free competition in
interstate commerce[.]").
See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.

as

See Alan J. Meese, Competition Po/icy and the Great Depression: Lessons Learned and a New Way

40

Forward, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 255, 266-75, 279-80 (2013) (explaining how
combination of Commerce Clause doctrine and Sherman Act ensured that "free
competition" governed interstate commerce).
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indirect burdens on such commerce, as such provisions posed no threat to
out-of-state consumers.
This unified competition-protecting regime survived into the 1930s,
invalidating private and public direct burdens on interstate commerce. 45
Indeed, the Court had no occasion to consider whether the Sherman Act
preempted state legislation that directly burdened interstate commerce
precisely because the Court's quasi-statutory Commerce Clause jurisprudence
itself preempted such restraints, rendering any Sherman Act involvement
superfluous.
The Court adjusted application of the direct/indirect standard over time
in light of changed facts that suggested the existence of interstate harm that
prior Courts had not perceived.4 6 For instance, early decisions, such as United
States v. E.C. Knzght, held that the Sherman Act did not reach intrastate
monopolies, even if such firms sold products across state lines.4 7 However,
beginning with Standard Oil, the Court read the Act (and the commerce
power) to reach activities that, while nominally local, "directly" affected
interstate commerce by exercising market power to the detriment of out-ofstate consumers, narrowing E.C. Knzght accordingly.4 8 While the effective
reach of the commerce power and the Sherman Act changed, the interstate
harm principle that governed the boundary between state and national
power-and the concomitant economic inquiry-remained fixed and
unchanging.4 9
A robust regime of competitive federalism generated
regulatory policy, including antitrust policy, governing economic activity that
4s

See,

e.g, Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (invalidating state statute

banning importation from other states of low-priced milk as a "direct burden" on

interstate commerce); Local 167, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291
U.S. 293, 297 (1934) (holding that local conspiracy among marketmen to raise the price of

chickens shipped in interstate commerce directly burdened such commerce and violated
the Sherman Act); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin,, 289 U.S. 103, 105-08 (1933)
(Sherman Act did not reach strikes impacting local firms purchasing steel from out-of46

47
48

state producers).
supranote 33, at 144-47.
156 U.S. 1, 11-18 (1895).
See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911) (rejecting
defendants' claim that the Act did not reach mergers between manufacturers that
advanced a scheme to monopolize interstate commerce); United States v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106, 184 (1911) (holding that the combination of the tobacco companies

See Meese,

was a "restraint of trade within the [first] section, and an attempt to monopolize or a

monopolization within the [second] section of the anti-trust act"); United States v. Patten,
226 U.S. 525, 541-44 (1913) (finding that intrastate restraint cornering New York cotton
exchange directly burdened interstate commerce); see also Meese, supra note 33, at 88-90,
144-147 (recounting development of this case law).

49

Meese, supranote 33, at 113-14, 144-47.
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produced no interstate harms and thus fell within the exclusive authority of
states.
This coherent regime and resulting allocation of regulatory power did not
In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court famously
survive the 1940s.
jettisoned the direct/indirect test as the standard governing the scope of the
commerce power, claiming that the standard was mechanical, formalistic and
unduly restricted the authority of Congress.50 Instead, the Court said: the
Commerce Clause empowered Congress to reach any activity that produced a
"substantial economic effect" on interstate commerce, even if the effect was
incidental or indirect. 5' This novel standard empowered Congress to regulate
conduct that produced no interstate harm and thus could not prompt
legislation favoring a state's citizens over those of other states.52 Wickard also
implied that state and federal power over local activity was coextensive and
thus not mutually exclusive, as the Court had previously maintained for
several decades. 53
Wickard was not an antitrust case. However, before the decade was out,
in Mandeville Island Farms v. American Cystal Sugar, the Court engrafted
Wickard's substantial effects test onto the Sherman Act, overruling five
decades of precedent. 54 As a result, the Act reached any restraint of trade that
induced a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce, even if the restraint's
harms were confined to a single state. The Court has applied the Act to
intrastate conspiracies between liquor wholesalers, 55 a monopolistic scheme to
prevent expansion of a single hospital,56 an agreement between lawyers setting
title search fees in one county,57 and a trade association's conspiracy to
restrict entry by subcontractors working on local building projects. 58
so

317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (conduct "may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, irrespective of whether
such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect."'.

si

Id.

s2
ss
s4

See Meese, supranote 33, at 93-95.
See infra notes 193-210 and accompanying text.
Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S 219, 229-39 (1948); Meese,
supra note 33, at 93-95 (describing Mandeville Island Farms' embrace of substantial effects
test).

ss

See Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 322 (1967) (challenged intrastate agreement between
state's liquor wholesalers produced substantial effects on interstate commerce because
defendants would purchase more out-of-state liquor "if free competition prevailed").

56

See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 743-44 (1976) (Act reached
scheme to prevent 49 bed hospital from expanding because, inter aia, an expanded
hospital would purchase additional supplies from out-of-state vendors).

57

See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783-86 (1975) (Sherman Act reached
agreement fixing prices for title searches in a single county). To be sure, some home
buyers in Goldfarb were from other states. However, as then-Professor Easterbrook
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'

Most recently, the Court affirmed the Federal Trade Commission's
condemnation of an agreement excluding some individuals from the practice
of teeth whitening in one state.59 The Commission had found that the
challenged conduct substantially impacted interstate commerce because some
affected firms purchased out-of-state equipment and supplies.60 Numerous
other decisions have also involved restraints that produced harmless but
fortuitous interstate effects. 6
Mandeville Island Farms read a novel principle into the Act, a principle that
authorized application of the statute to restraints that threatened no interstate
harm. While initially developed to govern private restraints, Mandeville Island
Farms' substantial effects test created broad potential to interdict stateimposed restraints of local trade previously deemed beyond the commerce
power. 62
II. PARKER AND ITS PROGENY
Parker v. Brown evaluated the post- Wickard claim that the Sherman Act
preempted anti-competitive state regulation. This part describes the facts and
holding of Parkeras well as subsequent decisions expanding the scope of state
action immunity and elaborating upon its rationale.
The part ends by
detailing the considerations of federalism and state sovereignty that both the
Court and academic proponents of Parkerhave invoked.

explained, Virginia residents bore the overcharge. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and

the Economics ofFederaism, 26 J. L. & ECON. 23, 48 (1983) ("[T]he overcharge [in Goldfarb] is
paid by residents of Virginia. This is so even for .. housing purchases by persons seeking
to move into Virginia .... The cost of attorneys' services is simply one component of the
price of buying a new house. Real estate and attorneys' time are complementary inputs
into housing. If the minimum fee schedules caused the price of attorneys' time to rise,
they also caused the price of real estate to fall. The overcharge ultimately was paid by the
Virginia residents who attempted to sell real estate.").

58

See United States v. Employing Lathing Div., 347 U.S. 198 (1954) (Sherman Act reached
conspiracy to restrict entry into vocation of lathing for Chicago building projects because
lathers used supplies imported from out-of-state).

59
60

61

62

N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 504-15 (2015).
In re N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, No. 9343 (2011) at 37 ("The ALJ found that the
[defendant's] acts have a substantial effect on interstate commerce."); id at 60-61 (ALJ
decision) (invoking "[p]urchases by defendants of out-of-state goods" to support finding
that conspiracy "substantially affects interstate commerce.") (citing Rex Hospital.
See supra notes 55-58 (collecting additional decisions applying Sherman Act to intrastate
conduct producing no interstate harm).

See Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The New Antitrust Federalism, 102 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1394
(2016) (after Wickard "the boundaries of the Sherman Act grew to reach any state
regulation that had even a small effect on interstate trade.").
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A. Parker v. Brown
Decided shortly after Wickard but before Mandeville Island Farms, Parkerv.
Brown considered a challenge to California's "Agricultural Prorate Act," as
applied to the state's raisin industry. 63 The Court properly described the Act
as an effort to "restrict competition among growers and maintain prices in the
distribution of their commodities to packers[.]" 6 4 The statute empowered a
State Agricultural Prorate Commission to propose to growers so-called "prorate marketing plans" limiting output and thus raising the prices of
agricultural commodities. Proposals became law if 65 percent of growers
owning 51 percent or more of acreage devoted to a particular crop voted to
approve it.
California farms produced 100 percent of the nation's raisin output, and
imports accounted for one-sixth of one percent of national raisin
consumption.65 Growers generally sold their output to local "packers," who
packaged the raisins and sold 90-95 percent to out-of-state purchasers.66 In
1940, the Commission proposed and producers adopted a raisin pro-rate
plan. The plan required the state's growers to deliver 70 percent of their
output of "standard raisins" to a "program committee" which could only sell
raisins at "prevailing market prices" or hold them off the market
indefinitely. 67
Growers were free to sell the remaining crop through
"ordinary commercial channels" at whatever price they wished, albeit only
after purchasing a "marketing certificate" authorizing such sales. 68 The Act
imposed civil penalties, fines and/or imprisonment for violation.69 Thus, the
Act coercively replaced the pre-existing regime of free competition between
private individuals with market outcomes determined by the State.
A dissenting farmer who was both a grower and a packer challenged the
program under the Commerce Clause and the Sherman Act.7 0 The plaintiff
63
64
65

66
67

68
69
70

317 U.S. 341, 346-48 (1943) (describing the Act); see also HR. 754, 50th Reg. Sess. (Ca.
1933).
See Parker, 317 U.S. at 346 (describing the purpose of the statute in this manner).
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4 n.5, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943) (No. 46).
Parker, 317 U.S. at 345.
Id at 347-48.

Id
See id (describing criminal and civil penalties imposed for violation of the Act).
See Amended Complaint ("Complaint") for Injunction at ¶ VI, Brown v. Parker, No. 78
Civ. (December 28, 1940), (identifying plaintiff as both a grower and a packer); id at ¶ I
(stating that the action "arise[s] under Article I, Section 8, Cl. 3 and Title 15 Sections 1
through 33 of the United Stated Code."). The complaint also alleged that various farmers
had delivered "approximately 100,000 tons of raisins to the defendant zone" under the
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sought to enjoin officials from enforcing the Act against him, thereby
allowing him to continue setting whatever price and output maximized his
profits in a free market.7 ' He argued that such equitable relief was necessary
because the Act's "unusual, oppressive and unreasonable" criminal penalties
deterred him from waiting to be prosecuted under state law before invoking
the Commerce Clause and Sherman Act as "defensive tactics," i.e., as
affirmative defenses.7 2 In short, the plaintiff invoked two possible sources of
federal preemption: the Sherman Act and the Commerce Clause. 73
Writing before Wickard, a three-judge district court enjoined the Act.7 4
The court held that the Prorate Act, while regulating local activity, directly
burdened interstate commerce and thus contravened the quasi-statutory
regime of implied preemption derived from the Commerce Clause. 75 The
court invoked with approval various decisions implementing the pre- Wickard
regime dividing authority over commercial subjects between states and the
national government. 76 Given the court's Commerce Clause holding, it did
not address the Sherman Act.77
California appealed to the Supreme Court, which, after oral argument,
ordered re-argument and additional briefing, including from the United States

program and that the "defendants were withholding said raisins from interstate commerce
in restraint of trade andfor the purpose of maintaining monopoly prices." See Complaint at ¶ XII
(emphasis added).
71

72
73

74
75

Id. ¶ VI (alleging that pro-rate scheme would prevent plaintiff from complying with
preexisting agreements to ship raisins in interstate commerce and from entering new
agreements, reducing his profits).
See Complaint ¶ VIII (alleging "that plaintiff is deprived by reason of said act and program
of his right to dispose of his raisins in interstate commerce").
See supra text accompanying notes 62-64; f PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, I ANTITRUST LAw ¶ 217d, at 404 (4th ed. 2013) ("Parker was necessarily,
although perhaps implicitly, a holding that the state statute was consistent with the federal
statute and therefore was not preempted by it.'" (emphasis in original).

Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
See id.; see also infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text (describing pre-Wickard
Commerce Clause doctrine preempting state statutes imposing direct burdens on
interstate commerce).

76

See, e.g., Parker, 39 F. Supp. at 899 (invoking United Leather Workers v. Herkert, 265 U.S.

77

547 (1924) (Sherman Act); Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922) (Commerce
Clause); Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913) (Commerce Clause)); id. at 899
("The grant in the Constitution of its own force, that is, without action by Congress,
established the essential immunity of interstate commercial intercourse from the direct
control of the states with respect to those subjects embraced within the grant which are of
such a nature as to demand that, if regulated at all, their regulation should be prescribed
by a single authority.") (quoting The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913)).
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (explaining how quasi-statutory Commerce
Clause regime rendered Sherman Act oversight of state-imposed restraints superfluous).
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as Amicus Curiae, on the possible application of the Sherman Act. 78 In a
brief co-authored by antitrust hawk Thurmond Arnold, the United States
argued that both the Sherman Act and the quasi-statutory regime derived
from the Commerce Clause preempted California's scheme. The whole point
of the Act, the government said, was to ensure that "competition, not
combination, should be the law of trade." 79
The "end sought," the
government continued, was "the prevention of restraints of free competition
in business and commercial transactions, which tended to restrict production,
raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers of
goods or services." 80 While the Sherman Act did not expressly refer to state
enactments, the Court's precedents established that a federal statute
preempted any state law "that stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 81
Invoking pre- Wickard antitrust decisions applying the direct/indirect
standard, the government contended that California's regulation of local
activity, in fact, monopolized the national raisin market and thus increased (i.e.
regulated) the price of raisins sold in interstate commerce. 82 There was "no
doubt," the government said that "the plan involved in this case controls the
market price," which increased thirty percent one year after the adoption of
the scheme. 83 It did not matter that the growers sold their output to
California packers. 84 Sherman Act precedent established that agreements to
"restrain or control the supply . . . entering and moving in interstate
commerce" were "a 'direct violation"' of the Act. 85 Because the plan reduced
output and increased the prices paid by packers, the scheme would
"undoubtedly directly affect and restrain the supply and price of raisins in
interstate commerce." 86 The pro-rate plan was "inconsistent with the policy
embodied in the Sherman Act" and thus preempted. 87

78

See Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1976) (describing this procedural

79

history).
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 54, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)

80

81
82

(No. 46) (quoting Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941)).
Id. (quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940)).
Id. at 52 (quoting Hines v. Davidovitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
Id. at 55 ("There could hardly be, we submit, a clearer case of monopolization of interstate
and foreign commerce than exercise of control over the marketing of the nation's entire
supply of a commodity.").

83
84

85
86

Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 57 (quoting Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310 (1925)).
Id. at 58 (citing Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934); United States v. Patten,
226 U.S. 525 (1913)); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, ¶ 217d, at 404

16:115 (2021) Federalism, Competition, and Sherman Act Preemption

135

The government's Commerce Clause argument echoed similar themes.
"Inherently national subjects" of interstate commerce, the government said,
were subject to exclusive congressional control. 88 The Court's precedents
"regarded as a matter of great consequence whether the burden of a statute
fell primarily upon persons outside of the regulating state." 89 "If anything was
of national commercial importance," the government continued, "the supply
and price level of a commodity moving in interstate commerce falls into that
category." 9 0 Moreover, the program plainly regulated that subject, granting to
a state agency the power to "monopolize the entire national supply of raisins,
determine the quantity to be shipped in interstate commerce, and to control
the interstate price structure." 91 The benefits of the scheme "accrued to
California Producers," with the result that "the action of the state is not likely
to be subjected to the normal political restraints upon legislation." 92
The
program did not merely govern a matter of local concern but instead
"determine [d] the quantity of raisins which may go to market-and the
market is the national interstate market." 93 Based on these and other
considerations, the government concluded, "the California raisin program is
unconstitutional." 94
A unanimous Court rejected both challenges.
The Court properly
assumed that the Sherman Act would condemn such a program if adopted
and enforced solely by private agreement.9 5 While the scheme limited the
output of "local" crops, the resulting harm fell almost entirely on out-of-state

87

("[T]he effect was to displace the competitive market in raisins for the benefit of
California producers at the expense of consumers throughout the country.").
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 54, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)

(No. 46).
89

Id. at 74-76.
Id. at 79.

90

Id. at 80.

91

Id.

92

Id. at 81.

93

Id. at 83.

94

Id.

9s

Id. at 350 ("We may assume for present purposes that the California prorate program

88

would violate the Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective solely by virtue of
a contract, combination or conspiracy of private persons."). Cf United States v. SoconyVacuum & Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (condemning agreement between refiners
designed to stabilize price of retail gasoline by coordinating spot market purchases);

United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 389 (1923) (condemning "agreement
which took away [defendants] freedom of action [and] subjected [defendants] to an

autocratic Bureau, which became organizer and general manager [of the industry].").
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citizens. These direct and predictable interstate harms justified application of
the Act to nominally "local" conduct, even under pre- Wickard precedents.9 6
Beginning with the Sherman Act, the Court conceded for the sake of
argument that Congress could preempt state-imposed restraints like
California's plan.97 In particular, the Court noted with approval several
decisions holding that Congressional legislation had occupied a "legislative
field" and thus "suspended" state laws. 98
Suspension, of course, was
synonymous with preemption, and such decisions exemplified what the Court
now calls "field preemption."9 9 The Court did not mention decisions invoked
by the United States recognizing "conflict preemption," which invalidated
state laws creating obstacles to the accomplishment of federal objectives. 00
Still, the Court found that the Sherman Act did not "suspend"
California's pro-rate plan. The plan was not, the Court said, a private
agreement but "derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative
command of the state, and was not intended to operate or become effective
without that command."' 0' Neither the Act's language nor its legislative
history, the Court said, evinced any purpose "to restrain a state or its officers
or agents from activities directed by its legislature."0 2
96

97
98

See supra notes 31-34, 39-40 and accompanying text (describing pre-Wickard Sherman Act
case law defining boundaries between state and federal authority over trade restraints).
See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
Id. There were, of course, numerous additional decisions holding that Congress had
implicitly preempted state legislation regulating local activities that nonetheless directly
impacted interstate commerce. See infra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.

99

See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 782 n.39

1oo

(1994) (distinguishing field preemption from other forms of preemption); see also Crosby
v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (discussing various forms of
preemption, including field preemption).
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 52, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341

101

(1943) (No. 46) (citing Hines v. Davidovitz, 312 U.S. at 67 and Savage v. Jones, 226 U.S.
501 (1912)); see also Richard Squire, Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause, 59 STAN. L. REV. 77,
82 (2006) (asserting that Parker "ignored Davidovitz and the preemption standard it
articulated").
See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350.

102

Id. at 350-51;

id.

at 351 ("The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and

gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a
state."); id. ("That its purpose was to suppress combinations to restrain competition and
attempts to monopolize by individuals and corporations abundantly appears from its

legislative history.") (citing Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 n.15
(1940); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54-58 (1911). Neither Apex Hosiery, Addyston Pipe nor
Standard Oil addressed the application of the Sherman Act to state-imposed restraints.
Indeed, Standard Oil opined that state-imposed monopoly of interstate commerce was
absent from the United States because of "the structure of our Government." See
Standard Oi!, 221 U.S. at 54, 57. While the Court did not identify which aspect of that
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The Court expressly invoked federalism considerations to support this
conclusion, contending that the Constitution's division of sovereignty
between national and state governments counseled against application of the
Sherman Act to such restraints:
In a dual system of government in which, under the
Constitution, the states are sovereign save only as Congress
may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an
unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress.1 03
The statute's legislative history contained no indication that the Act
would apply to such state action, the Court said, and the main sponsor of the
bill, Senator Sherman, had asserted that it "prevented only 'business
combinations."'104
Having rejected the Sherman Act challenge, the Court went on to reverse
the lower court's Commerce Clause holding that invalidated the scheme. 05
The Court conceded that California's regulation of "matters of local concern"
was "so related to interstate commerce that it also operated as a regulation of
that commerce," that is, the interstate sale of raisins. 06 Under pre-1890 (and
pre-Wickar) case law, this conclusion that a state was regulating the price of
interstate transactions or transportation sufficed to invalidate the scheme. 07
However, Congress had not, the Court said, exercised its commerce power
(given the Court's Sherman Act holding!), with the result that the Court

structure prevented such monopolies, the most obvious possibility was the Court's quasi-

statutory jurisprudence holding that the Constitution granted Congress exclusive authority
over inherently national subjects of interstate commerce.
accompanying text.

See infra notes 196-210 and

103

See Parker, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).

104

Id.
Id. at 359-68.
Id. at 362.
See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text; see also Rhode Island v. Attleboro EDec. Co.,

10s
106

107

273 U.S. 83 (1927) (invalidating state regulation of the price of electricity exported to
other states); Missouri v. Kan. Nat. Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924) (invalidating regulation
of the price of natural gas exported to other states); Balt. & Ohio Sw. R.R v. Settle, 260
U.S. 166 (1922) (invalidating regulation of interstate rail rates); Lemke v. Farmers Grain
Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922) (invalidating regulation of the price of grain exported to other

states after sale to local elevators); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277 (1921)
(invalidating state regulation of natural gas prices even though regulated party resold such

gas to intrastate parties before export to other states); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375 (1905) (fnding that Sherman Act reached conspiracy between meatpackers to
reduce purchase prices for local beef because such practices directly impacted interstate
commerce, their "object of attack").
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should "reconcile[]" Congressional and state power.1 08 Such "reconciliation,"
the Court said, required "the accommodation of competing demands of state
and national interests involved." 09
Analogizing to Wickard, the Court rejected the direct/indirect standard
for assessing the validity of the restraints, signaling that even direct restraints
of interstate commerce could survive Commerce Clause scrutiny."t0
The
inquiry was not, the Court said, whether the restraint was "direct," (as it
assuredly was), but instead whether "the matter is one which may
appropriately be regulated in the interest of safety, health and well-being of
local communities and, because of its local character, and the practical
difficulties involved, may never be adequately dealt with by Congress.""'
Because of the activity's "local character," the Court said, there might be a
"wide scope for local regulation without substantially impairing the national
interest in the regulation of commerce by a single authority and without
materally obstructing the free flow of commerce.""12 The Court did not explain why
the impact of California's self-interested control over the nation's entire raisin
supply was "[im]material."11 3 Nor did it mention various decisions
invalidating state regulation of the price and output of products subsequently
sold across state lines because they "directly impacted" such commerce.114
The Court confined its Sherman Act holding to state-imposed restraints
Such restraints coercively restricted the rights of
on market actors.
individuals to engage in the sort of free competition the Sherman Act

108
109
110

Parker, 317 U.S. at 362.
Id.
See id. at 362-63 ("Such regulations by the state are to be sustained not because they are
'indirect,' rather than 'direct,' no[r] because they control interstate activities in such a
manner as only to affect commerce, rather than to command its operations." (citation
omitted)).

11 Id.
112

Id. (emphasis added) (citing The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 398-412 (1913) and
California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 113 (1941)).
Neither decision cited was
particularly apposite. Minnesota Rate Cases involved regulation of rates for intrastate travel,
regulations that impacted interstate travel only "indirectly." See id. at 410-11. Thompson
involved licensure of transportation agents whose participation in interstate commerce

was incidental to their primary intrastate business. By contrast, the output restrictions in
Parker directly impacted interstate commerce and injured out-of-state purchasers.

"3

See Meese, supra note 44, at 316-19 (critiquing Parker on this ground); Stephen
Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionaism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. Ci1. L. REV.
482, 528-30 (1997) (describing how Parker exemplified relaxation of Commerce Clause

114

restnctions on state regulation of interstate commerce during the 1940s).
See supra note 107 (collecting cases).
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ensures."t 5 By contrast, the Court said, a state could not "give immunity to
those [private parties] who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to
violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful.""1 6 Nor, Parker said,
could a state participate in otherwise unlawful agreements or combinations
with private parties."t 7 The Court thereby conceded that the Act would
preempt some state laws, presumably because such state endorsed conduct or
conduct of the state itself would nonetheless conflict with federal law.118
Thus was born antitrust's "state action doctrine," whereby state-imposed
restraints of interstate commerce are "immune" from the Sherman Act,
regardless of their economic effects."t 9 Parkerhas remained good law without
question for more than seven decades, despite the Court's flexible approach
to stare decisis in the antitrust context. 20
B. Parke's Progeny: Hybrid and Municipal Restraints
While Parkerpurported only to immunize restraints imposed by "a state
or its officers or agents," subsequent decisions expanded the doctrine. These
cases protected restraints that private parties adopted pursuant to otherwise
valid state regulatory programs, reasoning that the threat of private antitrust
liability would deter parties from participating in such schemes.' 2 ' Indeed,
11s

See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing early decisions reading Sherman
Act in this manner).

116
117

118

See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
Id. at 450 (citing Union Pac. R.R Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941)).
See Milton Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 15 (1976) (endorsing Parkers holding but conceding that purported
state approval of such agreements "would violate the very concept of preemption and

federal supremacy"); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000)

119

(describing and applying conflict preemption standards).
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, ¶ 221a, p. 76 (defining "state action

immunity");

State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (Sherman Act authorized Court to generate antitrust
doctrine in a common law fashion despite considerations of stare decisis). While Parker
invoked Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904), the latter involved state regulation of
pilotage, a subject over which Congress and the states possessed overlapping jurisdiction.

See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1852).

Thus, the Court's Commerce Clause

doctrine of implied preemption was inapposite. If anything, Olsen confirms the symmetry
between the Sherman Act and the doctrine of implied preemption.
120

See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., 499 U.S. 365 (1990) (invoking Parker
to reject challenge to local regulations limiting entry into billboard market); Fisher v. City

of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1985) (rejecting Sherman Act challenge to California rent
control statute despite fnding that regulation produced same effect as private collusive
rent ceilings).
121

See FTC v. Ticor, 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992) ("The principle of freedom of action for the
States adopted to preserve the federal system explains the later evolution and application
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some such regimes require all parties in a particular industry to adhere to
prices set by a subset of the industry's firms. 2 2 For instance, a statute might
require liquor dealers to set retail prices equal to wholesale prices plus a
specified mark up.1 23 Some scholars have dubbed such agreements "hybrid
restraints," whereby "the government empowers private firms to make
choices, or to exercise discretion, as to the nature or level of consumer
injury."1 2 4 Such restraints "cede[] to private actors 'a degree of private
regulatory power' that results in a restraint of trade" 2 s States can immunize
such private restraints from the Sherman Act, and thus escape preemption,
if: (1) the legislature clearly articulates a policy to restrict competition and (2)
the state "actively supervises" the outcomes (e.g. price and output) of resulting
restraints. 2 6 The liquor regulation just described would satisfy the first part
of this test because the state has expressly supplanted competition. Thus, the
scheme's validity would depend upon how closely the state scrutinized
resulting prices. 2 7
Such "hybrid" restraints are a small subset of the universe of
unreasonable private restraints. Indeed, states' own antitrust laws generally
ban unreasonable private restraints.12 8 When it comes to private restraints,
hybrid restraints are the exception and not the rule.

of the Parker doctrine"); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1988) ("[T]he Court
subsequently recognized that Parker's federalism rationale demanded that the state action

122

exemption also apply in certain suits against private parties. If the Federal Government
or a private litigant always could enforce the Sherman Act against private parties, then a
State could not effectively implement a program restraining competition among them.")
(citing S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985)).
See Ticor, 504 U.S. at 625-31 (describing such a regulatory scheme).

123
124

See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987) (describing such a scheme).
See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, State Action and the Meaning of Agreement Under the
Sherman Act: An Approach to HybridRestraints, 20 Y ALEJ. REG. 269, 286 (2003).

12s

Id. at 286 (quoting Fisher, 475 U.S. at 268 (citing Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S.
654, 666 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
Ticor, 504 U.S. at 625 (evaluating private defendants' assertion that state action doctrine
sheltered collective rate setting from antitrust regulation); S. Rate Conference, Inc., 471 U.S.
at 55-66 (rejecting federal antitrust suit against state-authorized private rate-setting).
See Duffj, 479 U.S. at 344-45 (invalidating such a scheme because the state "neither
establishe[d] prices nor review[ed] the reasonableness of the price schedules.");
Allensworth, supra note 62, at 1410, 1413-14 (demonstrating that modem state-action
doctrine draws on administrative law principles).
See infranotes 288-89 and accompanying text; see also e.g., Richard A. Duncan & Alison K.
Guernsey, Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop: Will State Courts Follow Leegin?, 27
FRANCHISE L.J. 173, 174 (2008) (finding that thirty-six states have stated intent to
"adhere strongly" or "moderately strongly" to federal antitrust precedent when

126

127

128

implementing their own antitrust laws).
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The Court has applied a similar regime to restraints imposed by
municipalities, holding that such entities do not possess the sovereignty
possessed by states.1 29 Restraints imposed by municipalities are fully subject
to the Sherman Act, unless the state has clearly articulated a policy displacing
competition.130 There is, however, no "active supervision" requirement for
such restraints.1 3 1
Thus, Parker and its progeny recognize three distinct types of statecreated restraints that thwart free competition but may still escape Sherman
Act preemption.
First, there are cases like Parker itself, where states
coercively displace free competition, expressly setting price or output. Such
restraints are without exception immune from the Act, and thus escape
preemption. Second, there are hybrid restraints, where the state authorizes or
compels private actors to engage in anticompetitive behavior.1 32
These
restraints are immune from the Act if the state satisfies the elements of clear
articulation and active supervision. Third there are those cases where a
municipality coercively displaces free competition.1 33 Such restraints are
immune if the state satisfies the "clear articulation" requirement.134
Failure to establish the prerequisites of state action immunity for hybrid
or municipal restraints results in two legal consequences: (1) Sherman Act
liability for private parties who comply with such restraints and (2)
preemption of state or local enactments that authorize or compel such
agreements.13 5 It will be useful to distinguish between these categories of

129

See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., 499 U.S. 365 (1990); Cmty. Commc'ns v.
City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53 (1982) (rejecting state action immunity for municipality
where state had not clearly articulated policy to thwart competition).

130
131
132

133

See Cit of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 371-72.
See Town of Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46-47 (1985);

HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 1002 (2016).
See, e.g., Cal. Liquor Retail Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).

See, e.g, Ciy of Columia, 499 U.S. 365; Ciy of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40.
HOVENKAMP, supranote 131, at 1000-01 (explaining the clear articulation requirement

134 See
13s

as applied to municipal restraints).
See Midal, 445 U.S. at 102-06 (holding that Sherman Act banned minimum resale price

agreements authorized by state law because state did not actively supervise resulting
prices); Rice v. Norman Williams, 458 U.S. 654, 659-660 (1982) (explaining that Midcal
found that Sherman Act preempted California statute requiring price fixing);
HOVENKAMP, supra note 131, at 978 (describing Midcal as a case of preemption); FTC v.
Ticor, 504 U.S. 621, 637-40 (1992) (holding that state action doctrine did not protect

defendants from liability under the Federal Trade Commission Act because states did not
"actively supervise" resulting prices); see also Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (describing and applying standards governing so-called conflict
preemption); id. (explaining that such a conflict arises if compliance with state law requires
the party to violate federal law); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1987)
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state action immunity when evaluating the arguments against preemption of
state interference with free competition.
C. The Federalism and State Sovereignty Rationales for the State
Action Doctrine
The Court has repeatedly reiterated the federalism and state sovereignty
rationales for Parker and its progeny, invoking Parke's reference to our "dual
system."1 36 If anything the Court has increased the emphasis on these
rationales for the doctrine; modern decisions identify no other normative
justification. It is no surprise that jurists supportive of these values in other
contexts have invoked such considerations.1 37 However, jurists hostile to such
values in other contexts have also endorsed Parker and its progeny on
identical grounds.1 38
Numerous scholars have endorsed Parke'sunderstanding of the Sherman
Act.1 39 These scholars echo Parke's invocation of the nation's "dual system"

(invalidating state-imposed minimum
prosecution for violating state act).

136

rpm

at the behest

of plaintiff who feared

See FTC v. Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. 216, 236 (2013) ("Parkerand its progeny are premised
on an understanding that respect for the States' coordinate role in government counsels
against reading the federal antitrust laws to restrict the States' sovereign capacity to
regulate their economies and provide services to their citizens."); Ticor, 504 U.S. at 633
("Our decision [in Parker was grounded in principles of federalism."); Ciy of Columbia,
499 U.S. at 370 (Parker rests upon "principles of federalism and state sovereignty"); id.
("Parkeremphasized the role of sovereign States in a federal system."); Patrick v. Burget,

486 U.S. 94, 99 (1988) (noting that Parker "relied on principles of federalism and state
sovereignty."); Duffy, 479 U.S. at 343 ("Parker v. Brown rests on principles of federalism
and state sovereignty."); Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 38 ("In Parker, relying on principles of
federalism and state sovereignty, the Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as
applying to the anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legislature."); City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. at 53 ("The Parkerstate action exemption reflects Congress' intention to
embody in the Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States possess a significant

measure of sovereignty under our Constitution."); MidCa, 445 U.S. at 103 (quoting "dual
system" language); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light, 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978)
(same).

137
138

See, e.g., Ticor, 504 U.S. at 633 (Kennedy, J.); Ciy of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 370 (Scalia, J.).
Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 236 (Sotomayor, J.); City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 53 (Brennan, J.).
e.g., William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, Parker v. Brown, the Eleventh Amendment, and
Anticompetitive State Regulation, 60 WM. L. REV. 1465, 1472 (2019); James R. Saywell, The
Six Sides of Federaism in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 76 OHIo ST.
L. J. FURTHERMORE 1, 4-9 (2015); Jean Wegman Burns, Embracing Both Faces of Antitrust
Federalism: Parkerand ARC America Corp., 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 29, 38 (2000); Merrick B.
Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efiency and the Po/iticalProcess, 96 YALE L. J.
486 (198Th; William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process:A Reconstruction
and Critique of the State Action Exemption, 61 B.U.L. Rev. 1099, 1101 (1981); Handler, supra

139 See,
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and contend that Sherman Act preemption of state-created restraints would
trench unduly upon what they characterize as "constitutional" values of state
sovereignty and federalism.1 0 Several have also elaborated upon Parker's
rationale, contending that the Constitution contemplates that states should be
entitled to "regulate their own economies."141
Several such scholars argue that post-Wickard expansion of the Act to
reach local restraints producing no interstate harm bolsters the case for
immunity.14 2 Reversal of Parker, they say, would ensure federal antitrust

140

note 118, at 19-20; Paul R. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process andAntitrust: Relections on Parker
v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328 (1975).
See Page & Lopatka, supra note 139, at 1468-69; Saywell, supra note 139, at 4-9; Burns,
supra note 139, at 38-39 (invoking Supreme Court decisions recognizing the "fundamental

dual-government structure of the Federal Constitution" to justify Parker); id. (contending
that the "dual structure of the federal Constitution . .
'requires that Congress treat the
States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint
participants in the governance of the Nation [sic]."') (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 709 (1999)); id. at 38 ("When applied to antitrust, these [recent federalism] rulings
make crystal clear that, as a practical matter, antitrust federalism is here to stay. Even if
Congress tried to override or limit the Parker shield, such an attempt likely would fail.");

&

Page, supra note 139, at 1102-1107 (describing and endorsing "constitutional basis of the
Parker doctrine'; id. at 1128-30 (contending that "active supervision" requirement for
hybrid restraints contravenes Parkers constitutional foundation); James F. Blumstein
Terry Calvani, State Action as a Shield and a Sword in a MedcalServices Antitrust Context: Parker
v. Brown in Constitutional Perspective, 1978 DUKE L. J. 389, 419-24 n.193 (grounding state
action doctrine in Tenth Amendment case law); Mark L. Davidson & Robert D. Butters,
Parker and Usery: Portended ConstitutionalLimits on the FederalInterdction ofAnticompetitive State
Action, 31 VAND. L. REV. 575, 597-604 (1978) (same); Handler, supra note 118, at 7 n.35
(contending that preemption of state-imposed restraints would "breach the basic tenets
of the federalism upon which rests our constitutional form of government."); id at 15
(contending that Sherman Act scrutiny of such restraints "is plainly at war with the
fundamental principles of American federalism"); see also Brief Amicus Curiae for the Am.

Dental Ass'n, N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 (2015) (No. 13-534)
(criticizing preemption of state's anticompetitive regulation as "trampling upon the
sovereignty of the states in our federal system'; Allensworth, supra note 62, at 1402-04

141

(discussing academic literature contending that Parker rests on constitutional limits on
Congress's authority to override state regulation).
See Page, supra note 139, at 1106 ("Federalism considerations suggest that states should
presumptively enjoy the freedom to establish regulatory programs that are applicable

within their own borders without prior resort to Congress for approval by parties not
directly affected."); Handler, supra note 118, at 15 (contending that repudiation of Parker
would "shackl[e] B states' power to regulate their own economies'; Garland, supra note
139, at 499-501 (contending that Parkerreflects appropriate respect for outcome of states'
political processes).

142

See, e.g., Page, supra note 139, at 1107; Handler, supra note 118, at 17 (noting that, "[w]ith
the broadened conception of interstate commerce which now prevails, virtually every
business, no matter how local, spills over, to some extent at least, into activities that can

be said to affect commerce."); see also supranotes 54-61 and accompanying text (describing

144
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scrutiny of innumerable garden-variety police power regulations, many
governing purely local subjects, because such regulations restrain activity with
fortuitous but substantial impacts on interstate commerce.1 43 Federal judicial
scrutiny of local regulation would, it is said, replicate the supervision of state
economic regulation under the Due Process Clause during the Lochner era.1 44
These fears have a strong empirical basis. Aside from Parker itself, every
Supreme Court decision applying the state action doctrine has involved
regulation of local activity that produced only intrastate harm.145
According to several proponents of Parker, a well-functioning federal
system requires states to serve as laboratories of democracy that experiment
with various approaches to local economic problems.14 6 The modern theory

143

various post- Wickard decisions applying the Sherman Act to intrastate restraints
producing no interstate harm).
See, e.g., Page, supranote 139, at 1107 ("To give full preemptive effect to the Sherman Act
would go far beyond a prohibition on parochial legislation; given the virtually unlimited
jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act, it would effectively forbid all state regulation of
price and entry. For example, professional licensing, a primarily local activity, would
certainly be held to affect commerce enough to confer federal jurisdiction."); Handler,

supra note 118, at 15 n.71 (contending that reversal of Parkerwould authorize Sherman
Act scrutiny of state statutes "regulat[ing] price and entry in such diverse fields as
insurance, taxicabs, railroads, sale of prescription drugs, bank branching, buses, milk, sign
posting and agricultural products"); see also Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Foxes at the

Henhouse: Occupationa! Licensing Boards Up Close, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1557, 1582-600 (2017)
(advocating intensified Sherman Act scrutiny of state occupational licensing regimes).
None of these scholars questions the authority of Congress over analogous private
restraints of interstate commerce.

144

See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Garland, supra note 139, at 499-500
(contending that Parkerproperly rejected Sherman Act scrutiny and thus avoided Lochnerlike interference in state regulatory choices); Page, supra note 139, at 1105 ("This
presumption [of Congressional intent] amounted to a prudential limitation on the scope

of the Sherman Act based upon the Justices' experience in the closely analogous due
process cases."); Handler, supra note 118, at 7 ("It is ironic that the liberals of today would
substitute Parker v. Brown for the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as the
vehicle for throttling state legislation by compelling all regulation outside the area of
natural monopolies to conform to the competitive model"); Verkuil, supra note 139, at
334 n.36 ("[i]f these laws are randomly upset by judicial enforcement of the Sherman Act,

the values of federalism contained in Parker ... would have to be flatly rejected and the
lessons of the 1930's all but forgotten."); see also Note, Antitrust Federaism, Preemption and
Judge-Made Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2557, 2569-77 (2020) (contending that Sherman Act
preemption of state antitrust regulation would reflect judicial policymaking and thus lack

democratic legitimacy).
14s
146

See infra note 305 (collecting authorities).

See Saywell, supra note 139, at 7-8 (invoking laboratory metaphor to contend for relaxed
definition of active supervision and broader Parkerimmunity); Burns, supra note 139, at 44
(contending that antitrust federalism, including Parker, protects the existence of "fifty state

laboratories, in which ideas can be implemented and tested."); Handler, supra note 118, at
5-6 & n.26 ("To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
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of competitive federalism predicts that, under certain conditions, rivalry
between such sovereigns can produce optimal legislation.14 7 Preemption, by
contrast, would displace these laboratories as sources of novel economic
policies responsive to local needs.
Indeed, some have argued that, properly understood, federalism and state
sovereignty require more robust immunity from Sherman Act preemption.
Some, for instance, have criticized the requirement that states "actively
supervise" private parties' implementation of anticompetitive agreements.148
Others contend that restraints imposed by municipalities should enjoy
absolute immunity.14 9 These scholars contend that states should remain free
to allocate authority between their respective subdivisions as they see fit,
without satisfying procedural requirements imposed under the aegis of the
Sherman Act. 50
If Parker rests on respect for "federalism and state
sovereignty," they say, the Court should respect the otherwise constitutional
process that states employ to authorize localities and private parties to impose
anticompetitive restraints.' 5' These arguments would immunize any restraint
on competition that a state or its subdivision authorizes under a state's own
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel

social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.") (quoting New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see also
Note, suptra note 144, at 2561-62 (arguing that respect for states' role as laboratories
147

militates in favor of respecting diverse state antitrust regimes).
Frank H. Easterbrook, Federa/ism and Commerce, 36 HARV. J. L & PUB. POL. 935, 937 (2013)

("There is a ... tendency toward optimal legislation to the extent four conditions hold: (1)
people and resources are mobile; (2) the number of jurisdictions is substantial (no
monopoly or oligopoly power); (3) jurisdictions can select any set of laws they desire; and
(4) all of the consequences of one jurisdiction's laws are felt by people who live in or

consent to that jurisdiction (in other words, no third-party effects, often called
148

extemalities.")).
See Saywell, supra note 139, at 6 ("The federal government must respect [state]
sovereignty-not redefine it by requiring active supervision of a state's own agencies.");

Page, supra note 139, at passim (criticizing this requirement as inconsistent with federalism);
Handler, supra note 118, at 9 n.45 and 18 (criticizing proposals that would condition
immunity on sufficient "state supervision").

See Garland, supra note 139, at 502.
1so Id. ("Based on a technical, and debatable, conception of federalism, the Court declined to

149

Consequently, the

Court effectively treated federal antitrust law as a species of state administrative law ..

151

.

treat cities as equivalent to states for purposes of the Sherman Act.

The flaw in this approach is that the Sherman Act contains no warrant for policing cities'
pursuit of their parochial-but still public-interests; that is a matter for state law and
state courts.").
Id. at 502-03; id. at 495 n.57 (critiquing suggestion in Town of Halle that states must
"active[ly] supervis[e]" municipal regulation effectuating clearly-articulated state policy).
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constitutional processes and shield such authorization from Sherman Act
preemption. 52
Parker's proponents recognize that anticompetitive state legislation may
sometimes impose economic harm on other states.1 53 Some contend that
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence will interdict such enactments,
obviating any need for Sherman Act intervention, while leaving states free to
regulate local activity nominally within the scope of the Act.154 Any succor
from the Commerce Clause appears illusory, however. Parkeritself rejected
the plaintiff's dormant Commerce Clause challenge, even though nearly all
the harm produced by the challenged program fell on out-of-state
consumers. 55
None of these scholars has questioned that holding or
identified any decision invalidating Parker-type restraints. Given Parker's
deferential Commerce Clause review of state-imposed restraints, the Sherman
Act is the only plausible source of preemption. 56 Thus, these scholars
effectively contend that each state's internal democratic processes should
constitute the sole remedy for such wealth-destroying regulation, even when
out-of-state voters bear most of the resulting harm. 57

1s2

See Allensworth, supra note 62, at 1404 (summarizing contentions by some scholars that
federalism requires Sherman Act to "respect decisions made by a state within the bounds
of its autonomy-no matter what processes the state used to make them.'.

's3

See, eg., Page, supranote 139, at 1106-07.

1s4

Id. ("Considerations of federalism suggest that courts should defer to state regulation even
when the regulation affects interstate commerce within the meaning of these sweeping
precedents. Such an approach leaves the [C]ommerce [C]lause as a sufficient check against
protectionist schemes.").

1ss See supranotes 105-14 and accompanying text; see also Meese, supra note 44, at 269, 317-18

156

(describing Parkers repudiation of previous dormant Commerce Clause precedent);
Gardbaum, supra note 113, at 528-30 (describing how Parker exemplified judicial
relaxation of Commerce Clause restrictions on state regulation of interstate commerce).
Seegenerally Herbert Hovenkamp, Federa/ismand Antirust Reform, 40 U. OF S. F. L. REV. 627,
643-45 (2006) (explaining how state action doctrine ignores interstate harm).

157

See, eg., Saywell, supra note 139, at 7-8 (contending that Sherman Act preemption of
squelches local experimentation and innovation a deprives states of their position as
laboratories); Page, supra note 139, at 1107 ("Deference to considered state economic
choices thus constitutes the touchstone of the Parker doctrine. This approach draws

doctrinal support from the Madisonian model of representative government and dictates
judicial restraint as long as the 'process of representation' affords interested parties
opportunity to influence the formulation of policy."); Handler, supra note 118, at
("[TWhere are democratic processes by which unwarranted laxity of the states can
rectified."); id. at 20 ("I would not substitute preemption for substantive due process
achieve a federal censorship of state legislation; I would turn to the states as the forum
the correction of the mischief[.]").

an
19
be
to
for
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III. FEDERALISM-BASED OBJECTIONS TO SHERMAN ACT PREEMPTION
As the United States explained in its Parkerbrief, state-imposed restraints
of interstate commerce pose obstacles to achieving the central policy of the
Sherman Act, namely, reliance upon free competition to allocate the nation's
economic resources.1 58 To be sure, California's scheme imposed significant
economic harm on out-of-state citizens, unlike nearly all other state-created
restraints. 59 However, Mandeville Island Farmsexpanded the object of the Act
to include protecting free competition from local restraints producing no
interstate harm.
Straight-forward application of the Court's preemption
doctrine would thus seem to establish that the Sherman Act preempts all
state-created unreasonable restraints-regardless of interstate harm-that
produce a substantial effect on interstate commerce, because they pose
obstacles to achieving this objective. 60
However, some scholars and the Court contend that principles of
constitutional federalism and state sovereignty bolster if not require Parker's
rejection of Sherman Act preemption.' 6 ' Invocation of "federalism," or "state
Presumably such
sovereignty," does not resolve concrete cases.
considerations must manifest themselves within some doctrinal frameworks,
and not as a judicial talking point. The Sherman Act, after all, is a statute, and
only the Constitution can restrict its reach.
Still, despite repeated claims that considerations of federalism and state
sovereignty justify Parker's state action doctrine, neither the Court nor most
of Parker's academic proponents have specified the nature of their federalism
or state sovereignty concerns with doctrinal precision. 62
At best, some
proponents have invoked the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments as possible

158

See supra notes 79-80, 87 and accompanying text; see a/so Times-Picayune Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) ("Basic to the faith that a free economy best promotes

the public weal is that goods must stand the cold test of competition; that the public,
acting through the market's impersonal judgment, shall allocate the Nation's resources,
159

and thus direct the course its economic development will take.").
See infra note 305 and accompanying text (explaining that nearly all restraints sheltered by

160

See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text (collecting and discussing various

161

See supra notes 134-57 and accompanying text (discussing these contentions).
See, e.g., Handler, supra note 118, at passim (endorsing Parker without identifying any

state action doctrine produce only intrastate harm).
authorities enforcing "obstacle preemption").
162

constitutional doctrine militating against preemption); id. at 7 n.35 (contending that
preemption of state economic regulation would "breachB basic tenets of federalism upon
which rests our constitutional form of government is based.").
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sources of such immunity, usually without elaboration.1 63 As a result,
academic evaluation of the supposed federalism and state sovereignty
rationales for Parker's rejection of preemption requires identification of
possible doctrinal bases for such concerns, one or more of which could help
justify Parkerand its progeny.
Such concerns could manifest themselves in two broad categories. First,
federal preemption of state-imposed restraints
could be outright
unconstitutional.1 6 4 Second, preemption of such restraints could contradict
one or more canons of construction that courts employ to discern the original
meaning of ambiguous texts. The remainder of this article will identify and
then evaluate the possible arguments in these two categories that may
conceivably militate against Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed
restraints. As will be seen, evaluation of arguments in the first category will
help inform evaluation of arguments that one or more canons of statutory
construction justify Parker's interpretation of the Sherman Act.
IV. POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO PREEMPTION
The words "federalism" and "state sovereignty" do not appear in the text
of the Constitution.
Nonetheless, there appear to be two possible
constitutional arguments against Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed
restraints. First, a state could claim that such preemption exceeds the scope
of Congress's enumerated powers, including the power to regulate interstate
commerce. 65 Second, a state or private party could claim that, despite acting
within its enumerated powers, Congress has nonetheless interfered with some
attribute of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment, Eleventh

163

See, eg., Page & Lopatka, supra note 139, at 1468 (the Court has derived the Parker
doctrine "from the principle of sovereign immunity"); Bums, supra note 139, at 38
(invoking Supreme Court's then-recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as supporting

Parker); Page, supra note 139, at 1105 n.36 (suggesting that Parkercould be interpreted as
resting upon "the eleventh amendment or, perhaps, . . . the tenth amendment.");
Davidson & Butters, supra note 140, at 597-604 (contending that Tenth Amendment case
law justifies Parkers state action doctrine).
164

See Burns, supra note 139, at 38 (asserting that the Tenth and Eleventh amendments
prevent Congress from expressly preempting local state legislation otherwise subject to
the commerce power); Davidson & Butters, supra note 140, at 597-604.

165

See, eg, Nat'l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Congress lacks
authority under the Commerce

Clause to require individuals to purchase health

insurance); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating ban on possession of
guns near schools as exceeding Congress's commerce power); Schechter Poultry v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating Congressional regulation of local wages and

hours as exceeding the commerce power).
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Amendment or inferred from the overall structure of the Constitution. 66
This section will thus consider the validity of these two objections. Assessing
the strength of the first constitutional objection will require an exegesis of the
history and meaning of the Commerce Clause. This exegesis will also inform
evaluations of the second such objection and facilitate application of canons
of construction discussed later in the article.
A. Does the Commerce Clause Authorize Preemption of State Laws?

.

Article I, Section 8 empowers Congress to "regulate Commerce
among the several States ... "167 The Sherman Act constitutes an exercise of
this power. If the Commerce Clause does not authorize preemption of state
laws, Parker's state action doctrine would simply implement this limitation on
Congress's authority. Indeed, Parkerand its progeny would be insufficiently
protective of states' prerogatives, insofar as these decisions recognize the
possibility of preemption in some circumstances.1 68 This subpart evaluates
whether the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to preempt state laws that
impose restraints on interstate commerce. The subpart begins by assessing
the pre-Wickard constitutional status of such preemption and then moves on
to the post- Wickard era, when the Court's vast expansion of the commerce
power created new opportunities for the exercise of power to preempt such
state laws.

1. Pre-Wickard Preemption
When evaluating this first possible federalism objection, it is useful to
begin with a truism. Parties need only invoke state action immunity if the
Sherman Act otherwise reaches the restraint. As explained earlier, the Act
only bans agreements that are "in restraint of trade" and, in addition, restrain
"commerce among the several States." 69 No one doubts that the commerce

166

See, eg., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating federal statute
purporting to commandeer state officials to execute federal law); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating federal statute purporting to require states to
enact legislation taking title to radioactive waste).

See also infra notes 227-36 and

accompanying text (discussing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976));
Saywell, supra note 139, at 6 (invoking Printz as a source of the sort of state sovereignty
167
168

protected by Parker).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text (collecting decisions recognizing preemption of
state laws authorizing such restraints).

169

See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text; 15 U.S.C. § 1.
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power reaches private restraints. Thus, state action immunity only comes into
play in cases when Congress admittedly has the authority to regulate and
prohibit a contract between private parties that restrains trade and interstate
commerce in the same manner as the challenged state-created restraint.1 7G
Thus, any claim that application of the Sherman Act to state-created
restraints exceeds the scope of the Commerce Power necessarily depends
upon a constitutional distinction between banning purely private restraints
and employing the same power to preempt state laws that impose or
authorize analogous restraints. Under this approach, the former application
of the Act would be perfectly constitutional, even as applied to purely local
restraints that indirectly "affect" interstate commerce, while the latter would
simply exceed the scope of the commerce power, even if the restraints
impose direct burdens on interstate commerce and injure out-of-state
consumers.
As a textual matter, such a distinction has some superficial plausibility.
After all, the Commerce Clause merely empowers Congress to regulate
"commerce among the states." Beginning with Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court has
defined commerce as an activity between private parties.1 7 1 It might thus
seem that the Clause merely empowers Congress to regulate private
transactions and transportation. Such authority does not, one might argue,
include the authority to preempt state laws-the quintessential manifestation
of sovereignty-restricting such commerce.
However, such an argument contradicts both the long-standing
Commerce Clause jurisprudence that defines commerce as private activity and
the Court's uniform account of the rationale for granting Congress power
over interstate commerce. Indeed, Parke's own progeny implicitly rejects any
constitutional distinction between regulation of private conduct and
preemption of state-created restraints.
Despite repeated invocations of

170

See

Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943) (assuming arguendo that Act would reach
analogous private conduct); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783-86 (1975)

(rejecting contention that challenged agreement lacked requisite impact on interstate
commerce); id. at 788-92 (rejecting defendants' invocation of state action defense); cf

Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 229-30 (1899) (opining that
state enactments and private agreements can produce the same impact on interstate
171

commerce).
See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1888) ("Commerce with foreign nations and

among the states, strictly considered, consists in intercourse and traffic, including in those
terms navigation and the transportation and transit of persons and property, as well as the
purchase, sale and exchange of commodities") (quoting County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102

U.S. 691, 702 (1881)); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189-90 (1824) (defining commerce to
include buying and selling as well as navigation).
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federalism and state sovereignty, the Court has invalidated hybrid or
municipal restraints that, while authorized or even required under state law,
nonetheless fail to satisfy the sort of procedural requirements necessary to
confer Parkerimmunity. 7 2 In particular, the Court has held that such statutes
and the conduct they require or authorize "conflict" with the Sherman Act
because compliance would require parties to enter agreements that violate the
Act.1 73 Of course, some proponents of Parkerhave criticized even this limited
preemption, contending that a state actor's otherwise valid decision to
supplant competition should immunize any resulting conduct from Sherman
Act condemnation.174
While Gibbons defined "commerce" in private terms, it also defined
"regulate" as the power to "prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be
governed." 7 5 This definition implied an alternative source of rules, namely,
individual states. 7 6 The power to regulate, then, entailed the power (if
necessary) to displace contrary state laws to ensure that the rule chosen by
Congress prevailed.
Gibbons itself read the Clause exactly this way. There Gibbons, who
wished to transport passengers between New York and New Jersey, had
registered his vessel under the 1793 Federal Coasting Act. 77
Ogden
attempted to bar Gibbons from this market, invoking a New York statute
that conferred a monopoly over the operation of steam-propelled vessels in
172

See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 632-40 (1992) (invalidating state imposition
of collectively-determined rates approved by state-licensed rate bureaus because state did
not actively supervise such rates); N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 50315 (2015) (invalidating agreement between state officials to subject teeth whitening to

vanous regulatory requirements); Cmty. Commc'ns v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 51-57
(1982) (invalidating restraint imposed by municipality despite state law authorization); 324

173

Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 345, 346-52 (1987); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102-06 (1980); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (holding that Sherman Act invalidated a minimum
resale price maintenance contract authorized by Louisiana law).
See Rice v. Norman Williams, 458 U.S. 654, 659-660 (1982) (articulating and applying this
test to evaluate Sherman Act challenge to state-imposed restraint); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (articulating general standards governing
conflict preemption); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (same).

174

See supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text.

175

Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196 ("What is this power? It is the power to regulate, that is, to
prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.") (emphasis added).

176

See Hous. E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) ("Shreveport

177

Rate Cases") ("Congress is empowered to regulate-that is, to provide the lay for the
government of interstate commerce; to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for its 'protection and
advancement."' (emphasis added)); id at 350-360 (finding that the Interstate Commerce
Act preempted intrastate rates that directly burdened interstate commerce).
See Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1406-09 (2004).
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New York waters.1 78 Gibbons challenged the monopoly as contrary to the
Coasting Act and the Commerce Clause.
The Court invalidated New York's monopoly. According to the Court,
the Coasting Act "transfer[ed] to [Gibbons] all the right which the grantor
[that is, Congress] can transfer." 7 9 This "right" included the "right of trade"
between the states, including the transportation of passengers across state
lines, superseding New York's monopoly, which, the Court said, was "in
direct collision with" the state enactment.1 80 That is, the statute prescribed
that, so long as vessels possessed such a license, the rule of free trade
established by Congress-and not state-imposed monopoly-governed
commerce in the form of interstate navigation.181 In modern terms, the
Coasting Act preempted New York's grant of an exclusive license.1 82
Gibbons also went out of its way to reject claims that Congress had the
power to regulate intrastate commerce. Such authority, the Court said, was
"likely inconvenient" and "certainly unnecessary."1 83
This division of
authority, Gibbons said, reflected the "genius and character of the whole
government."184
The Court has treated Gibbons as a definitive exposition of the Commerce
Clause.1 85 Moreover, the Court's consistent account of the rationale for the
commerce power confirms Gibbons' interpretation, including that Congress
may preempt state-imposed restraints.1 86 This account begins before the
Constitution, when under a "helpless, inadequate Confederation," states
interfered with free interstate trade by protecting their industries from out-of-

178
179
180
181

Id.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 213-14.
Id. at 214-15, 221.
Id. at 210 (framing the inquiry as whether "in [its] application to this case [the New York
statute conferring the monopoly], come into collision with an act of Congress, and
deprived a citizen of a right to which that act entitles him."); see also Williams, supra note

182
183
184

185

186

177, at 1418 (Gibbons concluded that "there was no doubt that the New York statute
creating the .. .steamboat monopoly conflicted with the [Federal Act].").
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 266-67 (2000).
See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194.
Id. at 195.
See, e.g., Nat'l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 534 (2012); Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 150-51 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 251, 253-55, 271-72 (1964); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 120-21 (1942); Hous.
E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) ("Shreveport Rate
Cases"); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 228 (1899); Kidd v.
Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1888).
See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
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state competition or taxing commerce transiting the state.1 87
These
restrictions, like the Parker scheme, imposed harm on out-of-state citizens,
what economists call "interjurisdictional spillovers."1 88
Such legislation left interstate commerce in an "oppressed and degraded
state."1 89 These shortcomings induced the adoption of the Constitution,
which created "a national government . . . with full power over the entire
subject of [interstate] commerce."1 90 During the Nineteenth Century, then,
the Court repeatedly stated that the original point of the commerce power
was to protect commerce from the sort of self-interested state legislation that
had oppressed private commerce prior to adoption of the Constitution.' 9
187

See Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 440 (1879); see also Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of
Federalism and the ProperScope of the FederalCommerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555, 598601 (1994) (describing how states imposed import taxes exploiting other states under the
Articles of Confederation).

188
189

See LeBoeuf, supranote 187, at 598-601.
See Guy, 100 U.S. at 440 ("But State legislation such as that indicated in the cases which
have been cited, if maintained by this court, would ultimately bring our commerce to that
'oppressed and degraded state,' existing at the adoption of the present Constitution, when the
helpless, inadequate Confederation was abandoned and a national government instituted,
with full power over the entire subject of commerce, except that wholly internal to the

States...." (emphasis supplied)); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 445 (1825) ("The
oppressed and degraded state of commerce previous to the adoption of the Constitution
can scarcely be forgotten.';

190

Meese, supra note 33, at 105-06 (collecting additional

authorities).
See Guy, 100 U.S. at 440; Brandon Denning, Conjtderation Era DiscriminationAgainst Interstate
Commerce and the Legitimacy of Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 Ky. L.J. 37, 55-56 (20052006) (recounting this history); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 224 (1824) (Johnson, J.,
concurring) ("[Under the Articles] that selfish principle .... guided by inexperience and
jealousy, began to show itself in iniquitous laws and impolitic measures, from which grew
up a conflict of commercial regulations, destructive to the harmony of the States, and fatal

to their commercial interests abroad.

191

This was the immediate cause, that led to the

forming of a convention.").
Guy, 100 U.S. at 442 (asserting that Commerce Clause invalidates "local regulations,
having for their object to secure exclusive benefits to the citizens and products of
particular States."); id. at 443 (Commerce Clause prevents states from "accomplish[ing], by

indirection, what the State could not accomplish by a direct tax, vii, build up its domestic
commerce by means of unequal and oppressive burdens upon the industry and business
of other states."); County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1881) (absent the
commerce power "[t]here would otherwise be no security against conflicting regulations
of different States, each discriminating in favor of its own products and citizens, and

against the products and citizens of other States. And it is a matter of public history that
the object of vesting in Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the States was to insure uniformity of regulation against conflicting and
discriminating State legislation."); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 231 (Johnson, J., concurring)
(overriding object in "the adoption of the Constitution" was to "keep the commercial
intercourse among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints."); see also Meese,
supra note 33, at 105-06 (collecting additional authorities).
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Thus, the Court read the Clause as empowering Congress to establish free
trade as the rule governing interstate commerce. 92
For over a century, Congress rarely exercised this affirmative authority to
preempt state laws: the federal statute applied in Gibbons was a noteworthy
exception. However, dicta in Gibbons had also suggested that state legislation
interfering with interstate commerce was void for that reason alone,
regardless of whether Congress had acted.1 93 Later that century the Court
confirmed that the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to preempt state
laws. The resulting regime divided interstate commercial subjects within the
commerce power into two categories. First, certain subjects were "national in
their character" and "admit and require a uniformity of regulation."194
Second, a much smaller group were local "aids to commerce." 9 5
By default, states could regulate those (local) subjects in the second
category absent Congressional legislation. 9 6 By contrast, Congress's authority
to regulate inherently national subjects was exclusive. The Court employed a
doctrine of implied preemption to enforce these exclusivity and concomitant
limits on state power. Under this regime, Congress's failure to exercise its
power-that is, Congressional silence-over these subjects established its
intention that interstate commerce be "free and untrammeled." 97
By
implication, Congress could grant states such authority and sometimes did.198
192

See Charles McCurdy, American Law and Marketing Structure of the Large Corporation, 38 J.
ECON. HIST. 631, 648 (1978) ("The Supreme Court's commerce clause decisions of the
1875-1890 period . . . firmly established the Supreme Court's role as the umpire of the

nation's free-trade network.'; id. at 648 (concluding that, during the late Nineteenth
century, the Court "monitor[ed] the free-trade unit in the silence of Congress[.]");
Cushman, supra note 25, at 1107 ("The Court's use of the dormant Commerce Clause to
vitiate such parochial legislation played a critical, instrumental role in opening a national
market.").

193 See
194

Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 198-200.
See, e.g., Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697 ("The subjects, indeed, upon which Congress can act
under this power are of infinite variety, requiring for their successful management

different plans or modes of treatment. Some of them are national in their character, and
admit and require uniformity of regulation, affecting alike all the states; others are local, or

are mere aids to commerce, and can only be properly regulated by provisions adapted to
their special circumstances and localities."); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Port of Phila., 53
195
196
197

U.S. 299 (1852).
See Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697; Cushman, supra note 25, at 1115 (describing this category as
of "limited scope").
Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319-20 (explaining that state and federal power over such subjects was
coextensive).
See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 109-10 (1890) ("Hence, inasmuch as interstate
commerce, consisting in the transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities,

is national in its character and must be governed by a uniform system, so long as Congress
does not pass any law to regulate it, or allowing the states to do so, it thereby indicates its will
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This "dormant Commerce Clause" jurisprudence assumed that
congressional exercise of its commerce power, whether actual or presumed
from silence, preempted contrary state legislation. 99
Allowing states to
regulate such subjects, the Court said, would result in legislation favoring a
state's own citizens and industries, as states would likely legislate to further
"their own particular interests."20 0 Congress, by contrast, would consider the
interests of the Nation and thus adopt "just and equitable rules" governing
such subjects.2 0

that such commerce shall be free and untrammeled.") (emphases added); Walling v.

Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 455 (1886) ("We have also repeatedly held that so long as
Congress does not pass any law to regulate commerce among the several States, it thereby
indicates its will that such commerce shall be free and untrammeled, and that any
regulation of the subject by the States, except in matters of local concern only, is
repugnant to such freedom.").

198

199

See Norman R. Williams, The Commerce Clause and the Myth of Dual Federaism, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1847, 1877-79
authority to regulate
See Exxon Corp. v.
dormant Commerce

(2007) (discussing decisions sustaining federal statutes granting states
inherently national commercial subjects).
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 128 (1978) (determining whether
Clause "preempts" state regulation of certain marketing practices); id.

(characterizing Wabash, St. Louis & Pac, Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886) as
holding that "the commerce clause itself preempts an entire field from state regulation");

Gardbaum, supra note 99, at 796 (describing the quasi-statutory Commerce Clause holding
in Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875) as affirming "a general power of preemption");

200

Ernest A. Young, The Ordinay Diet of the Law: The Presumption Against Preemption in the
Roberts Court, 2011 SuP. CT. REV. 253, 265-66 (explaining that Nineteenth Century
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence preempted certain state regulations); Bowman
v. Chi. & N. Ry., 125 U.S. at 482 ("[S]tate legislation, however legitimate in its origin or
object, when it conflicts with the positive legislation of Congress, or its intention reasonably
impliedfrom its silence, in respect to the subject of [interstate or foreign] commerce must
fail.") (emphasis supplied).
See Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. at 442 (Commerce Clause prevented states from imposing
"unequal and oppressive burdens upon the industry and business of other States" to
protect their own industries.); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211,
232 (1899) (opining that Congress possessed exclusive authority over direct restraints of
interstate commerce); id. at 231 ("If ... state legislatures have full and complete authority
to thus far regulate interstate commerce by means of their control over private contracts

between individuals or corporations, then the legislation of the different states might and
probably would differ in regard to the matter, according to what each State might regard
as its own particular interest.'; Hadley Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143

F. 242, 244 (8th Cir. 1906) (invoking Addyston Prte to hold that the Commerce Clause
preempts state antitrust regulation of interstate commerce).
201

See,

e.g.,

Wabash,

118 U.S. at 577 (concluding that Congress's "enlarged view of the

interests of all the states, and of the railroads concerned, better fits it to establish just and
equitable rules" regarding rates for interstate transportation).
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Independent territorial restrictions on legislative authority prevented
states from regulating activity beyond their borders.20 2 Still, some intrastate
legislation could nonetheless affect interstate commerce. If such effects were
merely indirect, the state law did not "regulate interstate commerce in a
constitutional sense." 203
If the effects were "direct," however, such
legislation, despite its local object, nonetheless regulated interstate
commerce.2 0 4
Applying this regime of implied preemption, the Court
invalidated numerous state statutes that governed local activities if they
directly impacted and thus regulated interstate commerce.2 0 s These decisions
implemented the Court's account of the rationale for the Commerce Clause,
by creating a national market unfettered by self-interested state legislation that
interfered with the freedom to conduct interstate trade.20 o
The historical rationale for preemption-whether by express legislation
or implied by Congressional silence-limited the reach of the commerce
power. Unless an activity or state regulation thereof produced interstate
harm, national regulation was unwarranted. The Court's Nineteenth Century
case law thus assigned regulatory authority to that sovereign best positioned
to exercise authority in a manner that would improve public welfare.20 7 Thus,
states possessed exclusive authority to regulate those activities and conduct

202

See James Y. Stem, Note, Choice of Law The Constitution, and Lochner, 94 VA. L. REV. 1509,
1516-19 (2008) ("Every significant attribute of legislative power available to states was
territorially circumscribed [in the mid-late nineteenth century.]").

203

Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1888) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to
state regulation of locomotive engineers because such provisions only impacted interstate

commerce "indirectly"); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. at 23 (holding that state legislation only
regulates interstate commerce if it imposes "a direct burden upon interstate commerce or directly
interferes with its freedom"); id. at 19-26 (upholding ban on producing alcohol for export
because ban did not directly burden interstate commerce); R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465,
472 (1878) ("Many acts of a State may, indeed, affect commerce, without amounting to a
204

regulation of it, in the constitutional sense of the term.").
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) (invalidating state law banning sale of
meat not inspected in the state before slaughter because the regulation directly burdened
interstate commerce).

20s
206

Wabash, 118 U.S. at 567-77.
See, e.g. Wabash, 118 U.S. at 577 (holding that state regulation of nominally local rates
directly burdened interstate transportation); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336
See, e.g., Barber, 136 U.S. at 322-23;

.

U.S. 525, 538 (1949) (opining that Commerce Clause created a "federal free trade unit");

id. ("[The] Commerce Clause [ensures] that every farmer and every craftsman shall ..

have free access to every market in the Nation[.] . . . Likewise, every consumer may look
to free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from
exploitation by any."); see also supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
207

Meese, supranote 33, at 112-14.
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the harmful effects of which did not exceed their individual borders. 208
Congress, however, possessed exclusive authority over conduct that produced
harmful effects in two or more states, thereby raising the possibility that state
regulation of the same subject would favor a state's own citizens at the
expense of others.2 09 The resulting allocation of regulatory objects between
states and Congress was not necessarily static.
Instead, changed
circumstances could justify new exercises of the commerce power to
implement the unchanged interstate harm principle that informed application
of the direct/indirect standard.2 10
Thus, when Congress passed the Sherman Act, preemption of stateimposed restraints of interstate trade would have been perfectly
constitutional, although the Commerce Clause only authorized Congress to
reach restraints that produced actual interstate harm. The result was nearmutually exclusive regulatory jurisdiction.
The Court maintained this
approach for five decades after passage of the Sherman Act, employing the
direct/indirect standard to define the boundary between state and national
authority.
2. Post-Wickard Preemption
In Wickard, however, the Court granted Congress the authority to
regulate purely local activities previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the states.2 1 ' The scope of the Sherman Act soon expanded accordingly,
reaching local restraints that produced only intrastate harm and indirect
impacts on interstate commerce.2 1 2
The Court simultaneously adjusted its
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, allowing substantial state regulation of
interstate commerce. 2 13 Under this new relaxed standard, state legislation that
did not expressly discriminate against citizens of other states almost always
208

See, e.g, Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R Co. v. Iowa, 97 U.S. 155 (1876) (states possess
exclusive authority over intrastate railway rates); Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568 (1852)

209
210

(states possess exclusive authority over intrastate navigation).
Wabash, at passim (holdng that Congress possesses exclusive authority over interstate
railroad rates).
Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (187) (holding that 1866 "Act to aid

See

in the construction of telegraph lines" preempted Florida law conferring monopoly on

incumbent firm that had constructed wires before enactment of the statute.); id. at 9
(opining that commerce power "keep[s] pace with the progress of the country and

adapt[s] [itself] to the new developments of time and circumstances.").
211
212
213

See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing Wickar).
See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text (describing these developments).
Gardbaum, supra note 113, at 520-32 (describing relaxation of Commerce Clause scrutiny
during this era).
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survived dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.2 14 While sometimes justified as
necessary to shield local regulation from scrutiny under a greatly expanded
commerce power, the shift was more fundamental than that, protecting even
legislation like that in Parker that imposed substantial interstate harm.2 1 s The
result was a significant increase in the overlap between state and federal
regulatory authority.2 1 6
This resulting overlap presented additional opportunities for preemption
of state legislation.2 1 7 Congress has repeatedly availed itself of such
opportunities. For instance, the National Labor Relations Act preempts state
regulation of labor relations, even though labor unrest has numerous local
effects. 218 The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 preempts state regulation of
fraudulent advertising related to airline fares.2 19 The Employment Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 preempts state regulation of certain pension
plans.2 20
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 expressly prevents states
from blocking entry by firms that "provide any interstate or intrastate
telecommunications service."2 2 1
Indeed, this Act's preemption of state-

214

See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (articulating test that courts
employ to assess non-discriminatory laws that burden interstate commerce); see also
Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitai ng Dormant Commerce Clause Review for Interstate
Coordination, 100 MINN. L. REV. 129, 158 (2015) (noting that "it has been more than 25
years since the Supreme Court has invalidated a state law based on Pike balancing").

21s

See Gardbaum, supra note 113, at 530-32 (recounting these developments).

216

Young, sutra note 199, at 264-65.
Id. at 265-66 (explaining that rise in concurrent state and federal authority resulted in

217

sharp increase in affirmative statutory preemption of state law). This is not to say that
affirmative statutory preemption was unknown between Gibbons and Wickard. See, e.g.,
Napier v. Atl. Coast Rail Line, 272 U.S. 605 (1926) (national "Boiler Inspection Act"
preempted state regulation of safety features of locomotives subject to the Interstate
Commerce Commission); Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913)
(preemption of state law governing liability for damage to goods carried in interstate

commerce); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 350-60 (holding that the 1887 Interstate
Commerce Act preempted state regulations of railroad rates that directly affected
interstate commerce); Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1877)
(holding that 1866 Act authorizing construction of telegraph lines pre-empted conflicting

Florida enactment).
218
219

Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).

See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (finding that Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 preempted state regulation of advertising related to airline
fares).

220
221

FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504 (1981).
See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) ("No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal
requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to

provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.").
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imposed monopolies or cartels simply replicates the sort of Congressional
action sustained unanimously in Gibbons.22 2
While some statutes contain express preemption provisions, others, like
the statute sustained in Gibbons, do not and thus exemplify implied
preemption. 223 Among those that constitute implicit preemption, some
exemplify field preemption, while others exemplify conflict preemption, of
which so-called "obstacle preemption" is a subset. 22 4 In short, according to
nearly two centuries of unbroken Supreme Court precedent, the Commerce
Clause plainly authorizes Congress to preempt state-imposed restraints of
commerce among the several states.
B. Limits on Otherwise Valid Congressional Interference with State
Sovereignty
Because Congress has ample authority to preempt state-imposed
restraints of interstate commerce, any constitutional objection must arise
despite this affirmative power. The Court's frequent invocation of "state
sovereignty" separate from "federalism" suggests as much.2 2 s Moreover,

222

See PETER HUBER, MICHAEL KELLOG & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LAw 256 (2d ed. 1999) ("In keeping with the 1996 Act's goal of encouraging competition
through the opening of local markets, Section 253 of the Act preempts in sweeping terms

state and local barriers to entry."); Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635,
648 (2002) (authorizing suit against state officials seeking injunctive relief against state
regulation purportedly preempted by federal law).

223

CompareMorales, 504 U.S. at 383-91 (applying express preemption clause), and Hollidy, 498
U.S. at 56-65 (same) with Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. at 10-17 (finding that
statute preempted state law despite enactment's failure to mention states or state courts),

and Gamer v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488-501 (1953) (holding that structure and

224

coverage of statute required preemption despite failure to mention states or state law); see
also Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (expressly preempting statecreated barriers to providing local telephone service).
See, eg., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. at 372-73 (explaining that state

law creating obstacle to objectives of federal statute conflicts with federal law and is thus
preempted); id at 373-380 (holding that state ban on trade was an "obstacle to the
accomplishment of Congress's full objectives under the federal Act" and thus preempted);
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. at 873-886 (finding that federal auto safety
statute preempted state tort law that created an "obstacle" to achieving statute's
purposes); Southland, 465 U.S. at 10 (finding preemption because state statute "directly
conflicted" with federal law).
22s

See supra note 136 (collecting numerous decisions stating that state action immunity rests
upon considerations of "Federalism and State Sovereignty").
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some scholars have invoked the Tenth or Eleventh Amendment as support
for Parker.2 2 6
The Supreme Court has occasionally recognized that legislation within
the modern scope of Congress's commerce power may nonetheless be
unconstitutional because it intrudes upon state sovereignty. Perhaps the most
robust application of this principle occurred in Natonal League of Cities v.
Usey.2 2 7 Indeed, some proponents of Parker have invoked the decision to
support of state action immunity.228
Userf evaluated Congressional imposition of minimum wages and
overtime rules upon states and localities. Defending the imposition, the
United States claimed that such regulation was indistinguishable from federal
preemption of state economic regulation of private activity.2 2 9 The Court
rejected this analogy, drawing a sharp distinction between federal statutes that
preempted state regulation of private conduct, on the one hand, and those
regulating the states themselves, on the other. 230 The former, the Court said,
fell squarely within Congress's power, notwithstanding the Tenth
Amendment and state sovereignty, while the latter might not, depending
upon the nature of the sovereignty interests involved.2 31 Invoking the Tenth
Amendment and related precedents, the Court held that Congress could not
interfere with "functions essential to separate and independent existence," of
the states. 232
The Court cited, as an example of such interference,
Congressional legislation that determined where a state should locate its

226

227

228
229

230

See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text (collecting academic authorities contending
that Parkerrests on Tenth and/or Eleventh Amendment).
426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976).
E.g., Davidson & Butters, supra note 140, at 597-604; Blumstein & Calvani, supranote 140,
at 419-24.
Usey, 426 U.S. at 844-45 (recounting this argument).
Id. at 845 ("It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating
individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the
Nation and of the State in which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a similar
exercise of congressional authority directed, not to private citizens, but to the States as
States. We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to
every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress
may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the

231

Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner.").
Id. at 845-46 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 215 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)) (rejecting Secretary

232

of Labor's claim that both forms of preemption were constitutionally indistinguishable).
Id. at 845. See also id. at 842-43 (invoking the Tenth Amendment as supportive of such

state sovereignty; id. at 855 ("Congress may not exercise that power so as to force directly
upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral
governmental functions are to be made.").
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capital. 233 Applying this standard, the Court held that Congress could not
impose minimum wages and overtime rules on state governments. According
to the Court, such legislation would:
significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure
employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire
prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and
parks and recreation. These activities are typical of those
performed by state and local governments in discharging
their dual functions of administering the public law and
furnishing public services. 234
In short, despite its recognition of robust state sovereignty, Usery
simultaneously affirmed Congress's undoubted power to preempt state laws
that interfere with free competition.
Of course, the Supreme Court rejected that portion of Usery that did
protect state sovereignty about a decade later, in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transportation Authoity.235
In particular, Garcia rejected the
existence of general sovereignty-based limits on the commerce power. 236 Still,
the Court has continued to recognize and protect some aspects of state
sovereignty from otherwise valid exercises of the commerce power.
In New York v. United States, for instance, the Court invalidated a federal
statute that purported to compel states to enact legislation requiring states to
"take title" to radioactive waste generated by commercial nuclear facilities. 237
In so doing, the Court drew a distinction between such legislation, which
offended the Tenth Amendment, 238 and laws that preempted existing state
legislation regulating the private disposal of such waste. 239 The latter, the
Court said, was squarely within Congress's power over interstate commerce,
notwithstanding any sovereignty-based limitations derived from the Tenth
Amendment. 2 40
Moreover, in Printz v. United States, the Court held that
Congress could not commandeer state officials to execute federal law, even
though the law to be enforced was a valid exercise of Congress's commerce

233

Id. at 845.

234

236
237
238

Id. at 851.
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
Id. at 547-55.
505 U.S. 144, 151-54 (1992).
Id. at 156-66.

239

Id. at 159-60 ("Regulation of the resulting interstate market in waste disposal is therefore

23s

well within Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.

. .

. [U]nder the Supremacy

Clause Congress could, if it wished, pre-empt state radioactive waste regulation.").
240

Id. at 160.
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power. 24 1 Finally, in Gregoy v. Ashcroft, the Court read the Federal Age
Discrimination Act so as not to preempt a state constitution's requirement
that the state's supreme court justices retire at age 70.242 A contrary result, the
Court said, "would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state
powers." 2 43 While nominally a case about statutory meaning, the decision
assumed that the Tenth Amendment limited the extent to which Congress
could interfere with a State's regulation of its own officials. 2 44
Unlike Usery-which the Court overruled in Garcia-Pintz,New York and
Gregoy are still good law.24 5 None of these decisions, either alone or together
with others, bolsters Parke's rejection of Sherman Act preemption, however.
Nor, if it were good law, would Usey and its more robust account of state
sovereignty. Each of these decisions invalidated legislation that interfered
with the manner in which a State conducted its own activities (including
legislation), compensated its own workforce, or defined public offices. None
involved possible preemption of state regulation of private economic activity
Even Usevy expressly
such as that involved in Parker or its progeny.
recognized the legitimacy of such preemption, without suggesting that it
would interfere with state sovereignty. 2 46 In short, there is an obvious
conceptual distinction between laws that preempt state statutes that restrain
private parties and those that purport to interfere with the state's regulation
or treatment of its own officials. The latter potentially interfere with the
functioning of the state itself, while the former merely remove state-created
coercive barriers to private economic activity, just as the Framers and
Ratifiers anticipated Congress would do when exercising the commerce
power. 247 There is thus no "sovereignty" barrier that prevents Congress from
dictating that free competition instead of state-imposed restraint shall be the
rule governing interstate commercial activity.

241
242

521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991).

243

Id. at 460.

244

Id. at 461-63.

24s

See Saywell, supra note 139, at 6 (invoking Printz and Gregory in support of robust state
action immunity).
See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976) ("Congressional power over
areas of private endeavor, even when its exercise may pre-empt express state-law

246

determinations contrary to the result which has commended itself to the collective
wisdom of Congress, has been held to be limited only by the requirement that 'the means
chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the
Constitution."') (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262
247

(1964)).
See supra notes 191-192, 205-207 and accompanying text.
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V. FEDERALISM AS INTERPRETIVE CANON
Some of Parker's proponents might emphasize that Parker itself did not
hold that preemption of state-imposed restraints would be unconstitutional.
Instead, they might say, the Court invoked the nation's "dual system of
government" merely as an interpretive canon that resolved a purported
statutory ambiguity regarding the Sherman Act's application to state-imposed
restraints. Indeed, the leading treatise on Antitrust Law characterizes Parker
as having applied an unspecified federalism canon. 248 Viewed in this way
Parker's invocation of our "dual system of government" is unremarkable and
no different from reliance upon the rule of lenity or the presumption against
extra-territoriality when construing an ambiguous statute. 249
Neither the Court nor any of Parker's academic proponents has invoked
25
any particular canon in defense of Parker.
s A review of the academic
literature describing various canons potentially related to federalism and state
sovereignty reveals three such canons with possible application to the Parker
question: (1) the avoidance canon,2 s (2) the federal-state balance canon, 5 2
and (3) the anti-preemption canon. 25 3 This article will address the potential
application of each canon in turn.

248

See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supranote 73, ¶ 221b, at 220 ("[Parkers] rule of construction
was deemed necessary to protect the states' coordinate role in government."); see also, eg.,
Note, supra note 144, at 2558 (inking state action immunity to the anti-preemption
canon); Page & Lopatka, supra note 139, at 1472 ("[Federaism] functions as a background
norm that requires a limiting construction of the Sherman Act."); cf ESKRIDGE et al,
LEGISLATION & REGULATION 1207 (characterizing Parker as reflecting a "presumption

249

against application of the Sherman Act to activities authorized by the states") (citing City
of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., 499 U.S. 365, 370 (1990)).
See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (explaining and applying Rule of
Lenity); EEOC v. Arab Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 255-59 (1991) (applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality).

2so

At least one amicus brief has contended that Parkerrested upon a "plain statement rule"
requiring Congress to state clearly its intention to "alter the usual constitutional balance
between States and the Federal Government." See Brief of the Am. Hosp. and Ga. Hosp.
Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, FTC v. Phoebe-Putney Health

Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216 (2013) (No. 11-1160) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (internal citation omitted)).

vel non of the
251

252
253

This article addresses the application

federal-state balance canon, infra.

See bnfra notes 254-60 and accompanying text (describing this canon).
See bn/ra notes 266-77 and accompanying text (describing this canon).
See infra notes 307-17 and accompanying text (describing this canon).

This author

reviewed the following sources in an attempt to identify potentially relevant canons
related to federalism and state sovereignty: ESMIRDGE ET. AL, supra note 248, at 1205-08
(reporting 15 different federalism-related canons); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
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A. The Avoidance Canon
The avoidance canon requires courts to, where possible, interpret statutes
to avoid constitutional difficulties.254 Courts generally articulate the canon as
follows: where a statute will bear two interpretations, one of which would
raise serious doubts as to the statute's constitutionality, courts will choose the
meaning that raises no such doubt.2 ss The canon reflects a presumption that
Congress does not mean to enact statutes that run afoul of the Constitution,
as understood by the Court and reflected in its precedents.2 s
The avoidance canon does not support the result in Parker or the state
action doctrine in general. Successful invocation of the canon requires more
than a mere assertion that a particular reading renders a statute
constitutionally suspect.25 7 Nor is it enough that such arguments have "some
force." 258 Instead, any such doubt must be "substantial," 2 9 or substantial
enough that the contested reading would "raise the sort of 'grave and
doubtful constitutional questions' that lead [the Court] to assume Congress
did not intend" the contested meaning.26 o

2s4

GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012); Amy Coney
Barrett, Substantive Canons andFaitfulAgency, 90 B.U.L. REV. 109, 117-18 (2010).
See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (describing avoidance canon as "tool
for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on

the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises
serious constitutional doubts."); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Del. & Hudson
Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) (opining that, when "a statute is susceptible of two
constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by

the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.'; Knights
Templars' Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U.S. 197, 205 (1902) (describing "cardinal rule"
whereby if "the language of an act will bear two interpretations equally obvious, that one
which is clearly in accordance with the provisions of the constitution is to be preferred.").
2ss

See Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) ("The elementary rule is that every
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality.").

256
257

See, e.g., Martine, 543 U.S. at 381.
SCALIA

&

GARNER,

unconstitutionality
'substantial."').

supra note

253,

at 250

by one of the litigants is

("At most,
not enough.

the mere
The

assertion of
doubt must be

258

See Rust v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (declining to apply the avoidance canon

259
260

even though the Court "[did] not think that the constitutional arguments made by
petitioners in these cases are without some force").
See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 253, at 250.
See Rust, 501 U.S. at 191 (quoting United States v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,408
(1909)); see also Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000) ("where a statute is
susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional

questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt
the latter.") (quoting Delaware & Hudson, 213 U.S at 408); Debartolo Corp. v. Gulf Coast
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As explained previously, preemption of state legislation that interferes
with free competition and restrains interstate commerce does not raise any
constitutional question, let alone a serious one. 261 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has recognized and approved the exercise of this power for nearly two
centuries, beginning with Gibbons.262 Moreover, recognition of this authority
is well-grounded in the Court's account of the original meaning of and
rationale for the Constitution's Commerce Clause. 263 The power to regulate
which Gibbons defined as the power to prescribe the rule by which
interstate commerce is governed -necessarily
includes the authority to
displace state laws that unreasonably restrain such commerce and interfere
with free competition and the free movement of interstate trade. 264 Such
legislation simply ensures that the rule of free competition governs interstate
commerce.2 6 s
B. The Federal-State Balance Canon
Courts will not read a statute to alter the traditional federal-state balance
unless Congress has clearly required such a significant expansion of federal
power.266 While often employed with respect to criminal statutes, the canon

Trading Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction

of a statute would raise serious constitutionalproblems,the Court will construe the statute to
avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary

to the intent of

Congress.") (emphasis added)); NLRB v. Catholic Bishops of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499-501
(1979) (asking whether the proposed application of the statute "would give rise to serious

constitutionalquestions" (emphasis added)); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740
(1961) (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) ("Federal statutes are to be so

264

construed as to avoid serious doubt of their constitutionakity." (emphasis added)).
See supra notes 167-247 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 186-192 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for Founders'
decision to grant Congress authority to regulate interstate commerce).
See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824)

265

See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911) (Congress enacted

261
262

263

(defining "regulate" in this manner).

266

Sherman Act to "protect the free movement of trade in the channels of interstate
commerce").
See, eg, United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) ("unless Congress conveys its
purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state

balance."); see also Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) ("We have cautioned,
as well, that 'unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have
significantly changed the federal-state balance' in the prosecution of crimes." (quoting

Bass, 404 U.S. at 349)); United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 450 (1953)
("We must assume that the implications and limitations of our federal system constitute a
major premise of all congressional legislation, though not repeatedly recited therein.");

166

TirginiaLaw & Business Review

16:115 (2021)

also applies in the civil context.2 67 Justice Frankfurter once described the
application of the canon in the regulatory context. As he put it, the canon
rests on the assumption that Congress does not "take over such local
radiations in the vast networks of our national economic enterprise and
thereby radically [readjust] the balance of state and national authority"
without being "reasonably explicit." 268 Moreover, despite referring to the
balance of authority between two sovereigns, this canon nominally applies
only when ascertaining the reach of federal statutes that purport to regulate
private parties, independent of any question of preemption.2 69
The Court has invoked this canon in cases involving the putative federal
regulation of firearm possession,2 70 possession of gambling devices,2 7' and
arson of a private dwelling.2 72 Prior to Wickard and Mandeville Island Farms, the
Court also applied the canon in two decisions limiting the scope of the
Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, respectively.273 In all
of these cases, the Court rejected invitations to read a federal statute broadly
so as to ban private conduct historically within the regulatory jurisdiction of
states. 274 Thus, the canon helps protect states' regulatory prerogatives over

Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940) ("The maintenance in our federal

267

268
269

system of a proper distribution between state and national governments of police
authority and of remedies private and public for public wrongs is of far-reaching
importance.
An intention to disturb the balance is not lightly to be imputed to
Congress.").
See, eg., Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 513 (applying canon when discerning the meaning of the

Sherman Act in civil context); FTC v. Bunte Brothers, 312 U.S. 349, 355 (1941) (applying
canon when discerning the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act, a civil statute).
Of course, the Sherman Act also includes criminal penalties. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.
See Felix Frankfurter, Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 540
(1948).
See supra note 266 (collecting several decisions employing this canon to thwart application
of federal statutes to private activity).

270
271
272
273

See Bass, 404 U.S. at 349.
See Five Gamb/ing Devices, 346 U.S. at 450.
See Jones, 529 U.S. at 858 (quoting Bass, 404 U.S. at 349).
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940) (invoking canon to reject
application of the Sherman Act to violent union interference with operation of factory

that produced goods exported to other states); FTC v. Bunte Brothers, 312 U.S. 349, 355
(1941) (declining to treat local commercial practices as "in commerce" because "an inroad
upon local conditions and local standards of such far reaching import . . .ought to await a
274

clearer mandate from Congress.").
See, eg., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349-50 (1971) (rejecting contention that
federal statute banned any possession of a firearm, regardless of connection to interstate
commerce).
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conduct producing effects primarily felt within their own borders.2 7 s States
may exercise these prerogatives in various ways. They may ban such conduct
themselves, imposing the same, harsher or more lenient penalties as those
imposed in the federal statute, allow such conduct or even subsidize it.276 In
this way, the canon helps protect the sort of regulatory diversity ordinarily
associated with a well-functioning federal system.2 77
Because this canon addresses statutory regulation of private conduct, it
would not speak directly to the first category of state action cases, r4, those
involving possible preemption of state regulation of private activity, as in
Parker.2 78 However, the canon could apply to in the second category, namely,
so-called "hybrid restraints" i.e., private restraints authorized or required by
states and thus allegedly immune from the Sherman Act.279 For instance,
application of the canon could immunize parties' compliance with statecompelled private price fixing, so long as the state adequately supervised the
resulting prices.2 80
At first glance this canon seems to bolster state action immunity with
respect to such restraints. After all, many state-authorized restraints are
entirely local, involving activities that exceeded the scope of the commerce
power for most of our nation's history. 281 Application of the Act to these
restraints and the private parties that enter them would preempt hybrid state
laws purporting to authorize such conduct and impose a uniform federal

27s

276

Cf Handler, supra note 118, at 17 ("The preemption approach would in effect oust the
states of regulatory jurisdiction over the economic affairs of their inhabitants to be

superseded by antitrust or other federal regulatory systems.").
See also Jones, 529 U.S. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The fact that petitioner received a
sentence of 35 years in prison when the maximum penalty for the comparable state
offense was only 10 years, illustrates how a criminal law like this may effectively displace a
policy choice made by the State."); f Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 n.15 (observing that some

states did not outlaw firearm possession as such).
277

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (contending
that ability of states to "perform their roles as laboratories for experimentation to devise

vanous solutions where the best solution is far from clear" reveals "the theory and utility
of our federalism.") (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50
(1973)); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)). Cf Handler, supra note 118, at 5-6 & n.26 (contending that Parker and its
progeny properly prevent the federal courts from interfering with states' diverse responses
to regulatory questions).

278

See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (describing three categories of state action

279

cases).
See, e.g., S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985).

280

281

Id. at 65.
See, e.g., FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (state-authorized price fixing by
title insurance companies).
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policy upon numerous regulatory subjects historically left to individual states.
This enforced uniformity would prevent states from acting as "laboratories of
democracy" and thus experimenting with novel approaches to economic
problems. 2 82
Surely, a one-size-fits-all federal regulatory framework forced
upon local economies and preventing such experimentation would upset the
traditional allocation of regulatory authority between states and the national
government.
Closer inspection reveals that the federal-state balance canon has no role
to play in this context. As noted earlier, hybrid restraints are only a small
subset of private restraints potentially subject to the Sherman Act.2 83 The
Court has already crossed this bridge, ignoring concerns about the federalstate balance in the primary setting in which the Sherman Act applies; namely,
private commercial restraints not authorized by the state. Indeed, expansion
of the Act in these settings raised the prospect of preemption of local
regulation. 2 84 Thus, the Court has itself created the conflict between the
Sherman Act and regulation of local subjects that supposedly gives rise to the
need for state action immunity.
Sudden application of the canon to
immunize that small subset of private restraints that states have properly
authorized would constitute a selective invocation of federalism concerns.
To be sure, the Court initially read the Sherman Act to accord great
respect to the traditional federal-state balance as defined by the Court's preWickard Commerce Clause jurisprudence.2 85 Under this case law, both the
commerce power and the Sherman Act only reached those restraintswhether public or private-that imposed significant interstate harm.2 86
Moreover, Sherman Act jurisdiction over such restraints was exclusive, the
Court said, because states with authority over such restraints would legislate
"according to what each state might regard as its own particular interest,"
producing conflicting and suboptimal regulation.2 87 This jurisprudence left
282

See Saywell, supra note 139, at 7-8 (contending that Sherman Act preemption of stateimposed or state-authorized restraints squelches local experimentation and innovation);
supra note 157 (collecting other authorities contending that Sherman Act preemption of
state-imposed or state-authorized restraints will prevent such experimentation).

283
284
285

See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31-33, 39-40 and accompanying text (describing pre-WickardSherman Act
case law holding that the Act only reached restraints of trade that also directly burdened

286
287

interstate commerce).
See Meese, supranote 33, at 86-92 (describing the content and evolution of this case law).

See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 231-32 (1899); see also
Hadley-Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 F. 242, 244 (8th Cir. 1906)
(holding that state lacked authority over private agreements restraining interstate
commerce) (citing Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 246); James May, Anttrust Practiceand Procedure
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individual states with exclusive jurisdiction over intrastate restraints that may
have affected commerce but produced no interstate harm. 288 Indeed, during
the Sherman Act's early years, state antitrust statutes accounted for more
prosecutions and fines than the Sherman Act. 289
All this changed in the 1940s, however, as the Court expanded the reach
of the Sherman Act by engrafting Wickard's substantial effects test onto the
statute.2 90 As explained earlier, the Court has repeatedly applied the Act to
private restraints that produce no interstate harm and thus would have fallen
within exclusive state authority under the principle that previously animated
the Court's Commerce Clause and Sherman Act jurisprudence.2 9' Each of
these restraints may have produced significant antitrust harm, such as higher
prices, and thus "restrained trade." In each case, however, the harm was
confined to a single state, even if the restraint also produced unrelated benign
effects in other states. Thus, states possessed optimal incentives to legislate
with respect to such conduct, and the Court did not suggest otherwise.2 92
Mandeville Island Farms and its progeny applied the Sherman Act to local
private restraints producing no interstate harm. This significant expansion of
the Act assuredly upset the pre-Wickard "federal-state balance" that had
characterized the scope of the Act for over five decades, by banning restraints
over which individual states had possessed exclusive regulatory authority. 293
Recall here the admonition by Parke's proponents that states should function
as laboratories of democracy when making economic policy, unencumbered

in the Formative Era: The Constitutionaland Conceptual Reach

of State Antitrust Law: 1880-1918,

135 U. PENN. L. REV. 495, 518 & n.117 (1987) (collecting decisions holding that states

288

289
290
291

lacked authority over private restraints of interstate commerce); supra notes 199-201 and
accompanying text.
See Adyston PTpe, 175 U.S. at 247 ("Although the jurisdiction of Congress over commerce
among the states is full and complete, it is not questioned that it has none over that which
is wholly within a state, and therefore none over combinations or agreements so far as

they relate to a restraint of such trade or commerce.").
See May, supranote 287, at 500-02.
See, eg., Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar, 334 U.S 219 (1948).
See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text (collecting and discussing such decisions).

292

Cf supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text (describing how courts assumed that states

293

possessed proper incentives to regulate intrastate conduct that merely impacted interstate
commerce indirectly).
See, eg., State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Ark. Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212 (1913) (sustaining
challenge to cartel limiting output of lumber within the state); State ex rel. Crow v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 52 S.W. 595 (Mo. 1899) (rejecting liberty of contract challenge
to state ban on collusion between fire insurance companies); see also May, supra note 287,

at 497-507 (describing state antitrust regulation of intra-state restraints during this period);
supra notes 29-30; 39-40 204 and accompanying text (describing case law holding that the

commerce power does not reach conduct that produces effects confined to a single state).
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by the specter of Sherman Act preemption.2 94 The Supreme Court has itself
opined that the sort of sovereignty that gives rise to Parker immunity,
including the authority to shelter private restraints, protects each state's
"freedom of action" with respect to economic affairs.29 s
If states are to be sovereign laboratories that experiment with novel
solutions to economic problems, such "freedom of action" surely includes
discretion not to ban conduct within a polity's borders that produces no
interstate harm, even if the Sherman Act condemns analogous interstate
restraints. The Court has implied as much when implementing the federalstate balance canon in other contexts, narrowing federal statutes so as not to
Indeed, the theory of
ban conduct states have also left unscathed.2 9 6
competitive federalism that implements the "laboratories" metaphor holds
that interjurisdictional rivalry can only produce optimal laws if, inter akIa, states
retain complete flexibility in lawmaking.2 97
In the antitrust context, for instance, such experimentation could include
per se legality for certain forms of local conduct that the Sherman Act would
ban as unlawful per se or subject to Rule of Reason analysis. 298 It could also
include a reasonable price defense for naked horizontal price fixing2 99 or Rule
of Reason analysis for restraints deemed unlawful per se under the Sherman

294

See Handler, supra note 118, at 5-6 & n.26; supra note 261 and accompanying text

29s

See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992).
See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348, n.15 (1971) (fnding it noteworthy that some

(collecting other scholarly authorities to same effect).
296

states do not ban firearm possession at all). Cf Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 859
(2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasizing that application of federal arson statute to
local activities would displace state policy choices because federal penalties vastly
297

298

exceeded state punishment).
See Easterbrook, supra note 147, at 937 (noting that competitive federalism can only
induce optimal rules if, inter a/ka, states can "select any set of laws they desire").
Cf Alan J. Meese, IntrabrandRestraints and the Theoy of the Firm, 83 N.C. L. REv. 5 (2004)
(contending that intrabrand restraints such as minimum rpm and exclusive territories

should be lawful per se); Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CH1. L. REV.
886 (1981) (arguing that maximum resale price maintenance should be lawful per se);
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (holding that
courts should analyze minimum resale price maintenance under the Rule of Reason); State
Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (rejecting argument that maximum resale price

maintenance should be lawful per se and instead holding that courts should subject such
conduct to the Rule of Reason).
299

See, e.g., Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522 (1880) (enforcing horizontal price
fixing agreement because it did not set unreasonable prices).
Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. 411
horizontal price fixing).

Cf FTC v. Superior Court

(1990) (rejecting reasonable price defense for naked

16:115 (2021) Federalism, Competition, and Sherman Act Preemption

171

Act. 3 oo
Finally, states could adopt identical substantive rules as those
established under the Sherman Act while imposing less draconian remedies. 3o
A Court truly concerned with the federal-state balance would read the Act to
encourage such experimentation, so long as the activities subject to potential
regulation produce no interstate harm. 30 2
The Court's post- Wickard
jurisprudence governing the reach of the Sherman Act with respect to private
restraints contradicts these principles and upsets the federal-state balance. 30 3
None of the post- Wickard decisions applying the expanded Sherman Act
to local restraints producing no interstate harm has mentioned the "federalstate balance" canon, let alone explained why such an expansive application
300

301

For instance, states could decide that those tying contracts currently deemed unlawful per
se under the Sherman Act should instead be analyzed under the Rule of Reason. Compare
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1985) (tying contracts
imposed by firms with market power are unlawful per se) with id. at 33-42 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (contending that courts should analyze all tying contracts under the Rule of
Reason).
Violation of the Sherman Act, of course, is a felony, and parties injured can obtain

damages triple the harm they suffered. Cf Jones, 529 U.S. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(contending that application of federal arson statute to arson of a single dwelling
"effectively displace[d] a policy choice made by the State" because resulting federal prison
sentence was more than triple the maximum penalty for violating comparable state law).
302

See D. Bruce Johnsen & Moin A. Yahya, The Evolution of Sherman Act Jurisdiction:A Roadmap
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 403 (2004).
To be sure, the federal-state balance canon is just that, a canon. It does not bar Congress
from exercising its recognized authority to upset that balance, so long as it speaks with

for Competitive Federaism, 7

sufficient clarity. However, the Supreme Court has not explained why the Sherman Act
satisfies this clear statement requirement with respect to local private restraints that

produce no interstate harm.

At most, the Court has opined that Congress meant to

exercise the full extent of its commerce power when it passed the Act.

See Summit

Health v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 328 & n.7 (1991) (concluding that the Congress that
passed the Sherman Act intended to "g[o] as far as the Constitution permits Congress to
go"); Gulf v. Copp Paving, 419 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1974) (Congress "wanted to go to the
utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements.

.

303

.. ") (dicta). However, as I have explained elsewhere, there is no indication that the 1890
Congress believed that its powers over interstate commerce exceeded the authority
described in the Court's pre-1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See Meese, supra note
33, at 136-44. Thus, the "utmost extent" of Congress's constitutional power in 1890 did

not include the authority to regulate intrastate restraints that produced only incidental
impacts on interstate commerce.

See supra notes 29-30, 204 and accompanying text. Nor

is there any reason to think that Congress meant to grant federal courts the authority to
expand the scope of the Sherman Act whenever the Supreme Court replaced one
Commerce Clause standard with another. See Meese, supra note 33, at 78-86. Thus,

stipulation that Congress exercised all the power it possessed when it passed the Sherman
Act is entirely consistent with an approach to the Act that maintains the traditional
federal-state balance exemplified and implemented by the Court's pre-Wickard Sherman
Act jurisprudence. Application of the federal-state balance canon would seem to bolster
the pre-Wickard approach, not undermine it.
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of the Act survives this principle. There is no apparent basis for sudden
invocation of the canon simply because a private restraint falls into that small
category of restraints blessed by the state. If federal-state balance concerns
are to inform the Court's reading of the Sherman Act with respect to private
restraints, such concerns should apply whether or not the state has approved
or encouraged a restraint.
Indeed, restoring the Act to its original and more limited scope r's a vis all
private restraints, whether purely private or hybrid, would attenuate the main
concerns that motivate Parker's proponents and perhaps even the Court itself.
Recall that some proponents contend that state action immunity prevents the
sort of discredited judicial supervision of local regulation associated with the
Lochner era. 304 However, nearly all Supreme Court decisions evaluating
assertions of state action immunity involve restraints that produce no
interstate harm. 30 s Thus, contracting the scope of the Act so as to reach only
those restraints that produce interstate harm would nearly eliminate potential
conflicts between Sherman Act regulation, on the one hand, and state
regulation of local economic activity, on the other. Indeed, one leading
scholar correctly observed more than three decades ago that restoring the
original narrower reach of the Act would all but eliminate the need for the
sort of accommodation between state and federal regulation that Parkerand
its progeny represent.306
Put another way, the Court's post- Wickard decision to replace the
direct/indirect standard with the substantial effects test itself created the very

304

Cf Handler, supra note 118, at 7 (contending that reversal of Parkerwould empower
federal courts to replicate Lochner's economic due process jurisprudence under the aegis of
the Sherman Act); supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (collecting additional

authorities invoking identical considerations).
30s

See, e.g., N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 (2015) (challenging a conspiracy
to exclude some teeth whiteners from a single state's dental market); City of Columbia v.
Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991) (challenging a single city's regulation of
billboards); Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986) (challenging a single city's rent
control); Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579
(1976) (challenging a utility's requirement that a subset of state's consumers purchase light

bulbs from the defendant); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (challenging an
agreement fixing prices for title searches in a single county).

306

Professor Hovenkamp has

suggested that Parker is the only Supreme Court state action decision that involved a
regime producing interstate harm. See Hovenkamp, supra note 156, at 644-45.
See Easterbrook, supra note 57, at 41 (noting that "[t]he need for accommodation between
state and federal law arises only because the Sherman Act has grown with the growth of
the commerce power. The problem post-dates the statute," and explaining that
narrowing the scope of the Sherman Act "to what Congress might have contemplated in

1890 .. . would obviate most of the need for accommodation" between state regulation
and the Sherman Act).
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federalism problem-a putative conflict between local regulation and the
Sherman Act-that immunity for properly-authorized hybrid restraints
purports to solve. Instead of militating against preemption as such, the
Lochnetesque concerns about federal intrusion into state regulation of local
activity may just as well support consistent application of the federal-state
balance canon, restoration of the direct/indirect standard and thus retraction
of the scope of the Sherman Act across the board. Restoration of the
traditional allocation of antitrust authority would largely eliminate the
innumerable potential conflicts between local regulation and the Sherman
Act. Failing such restoration, however, there is no apparent rationale for the
sort of selective invocation of the federal-state balance canon that results in
the application of the Act to local but unauthorized private restraints but
simultaneous immunity for hybrid (but still private) restraints with an identical
impact, simply because the state imposed or authorized them.
In sum, there are two principled approaches to the federal-state balance
in this context: (1) apply the canon consistently, retracting the general scope
of the Act or (2) ignore the canon consistently and thus invalidate stateauthorized restraints that interfere with free competition and thwart the
objective of the Sherman Act. That is, the Supreme Court should either
ignore such concerns in both contexts or give them equal weight across the
board, reducing the reach of the Sherman Act accordingly. The current
approach-immunity only for those local private restraints that states have
imposed or approved-purports to solve a problem of the Court's own
creation by invoking a haphazard and ill-conceived vision of federalism.
C. The Anti-Preemption Canon
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that federal law will not preempt
state regulation in fields over which states have traditionally exercised
regulatory authority unless Congress makes its intent to do so "clear and
manifest." 30 7 If applicable, this canon would seem to protect state-imposed
307

Lorrilard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U. S. 525, 541-542 (2001) ("Because 'federal law is
said to bar state action in [a] fiel[d] of traditional state regulation,' namely, advertising, we
'wor[k] on the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [a]re not to be

superseded by the Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress"' (citation omitted)); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)

("`[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long
presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.' In areas
of traditional state regulation, we assume that a federal statute has not supplanted state

law unless Congress has made such an intention ' "clear and manifest." "' (citation
omitted) (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
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restraints such as those sustained in Parker from Sherman Act preemption.
After reviewing the rationale and content of this canon, this subpart applies
the canon in two settings: (1) state-imposed restraints that, like those in
Parker, directly burden interstate commerce and (2) state-imposed restraints
that impact interstate commerce only indirectly.

1. Rationale and Content of the Anti-Preemption Canon
There was little need for such a canon before Wickard, when the Court
placed meaningful limits on the commerce power, and state and federal
authority over nearly all commercial activity was mutually exclusive.30 s
However, the Court's relaxation of limits on the commerce power, coupled
with less intrusive applications of the dormant Commerce Clause, created
concurrent state and national authority over most of the nation's commercial
activity. 30 9 The resulting vast overlap in state and federal authority induced
the Court to develop detailed rules governing preemption, including this
canon, shortly after Wickard.3 'o
As the Court put it more recently: "When addressing questions of express
or implied pre-emption, we begin our analysis 'with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' 311 This
logic even applies when the federal statute includes an express preemption
clause. 3 12

Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947))); see also Young, supra note 199, at 265-69 (describing development of this
canon); Note, supra note 144, at 2558 (inking state action immunity to the antipreemption canon).
308

See generally supra notes 196-210 and accompanying text (describing pre-Wickardregime of
dual federalism and resulting lack of overlap between state and federal powers).

309

See supra notes 211-17 and accompanying text (describing this doctrinal evolution and the
resulting vast expansion in overlap between state and federal regulatory power); Young,

310

supra note 199, at 265 ("In the nineteenth century, most cases that might raise preemption
issues today would have been decided under the doctrine of dual federalism-that is, by
determining whether a given exertion of regulatory authority fell within an area delegated
to federal authority or the sphere reserved to the states.").
See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 236 (1947) (announcing and applying this canon; see also Young,
supra note 199, at 265-66 (explaining how such increased overlap between state and

federal power induced more detailed preemption doctrine).
311

See Altria Grp. Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).

312

Id. at 77 ("[W]hen the text of a pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one

plausible reading, courts ordinarily 'accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption."')
(quoting Bates, 544 U.S. at 449).
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Both the Supreme Court and leading scholars have characterized this
canon and preemption jurisprudence more generally as part of a larger effort
to safeguard the overall federal-state balance. 313 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has said that the canon applies whenever a statute disturbs this balance.3 1 4
Proponents of the presumption have also defended this canon as an
appropriate response to other developments in federalism doctrine. Noting
the Court's failure to enforce meaningful limits on Congress's commerce
power,315 these scholars explain that this presumption helps protect the
original allocation of state and national authority, by requiring Congress to
overcome the legislative inertia necessary to speak clearly before preempting
the sort of state legislation the canon protects.3 16 In this way, it is said, the
canon functions as a "procedural [safeguard] of federalism." 317

313

See, eg, United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000) (applying preemption doctnne so
as to preserve "the established federal-state balance in matters of maritime commerce");
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (requiring Congress to make its intention
to preempt state law "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" where such
preemption "would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers")
(citation omitted); id at 461 (implementing presumption against preemption by requiring a

"clear statement" before finding that law "affect[s] the federal-state balance") (citation
omitted); Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1985)
(rejecting proposed preemption as "inconsistent with the federal-state balance embodied
in this Court's Supremacy Clause jurisprudence"); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848,
859 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting "kinship between our well-established
presumption against federal pre-emption of state law" and the federal-state balance
canon); Young, supra note 199, at 265 (asserting that the presumption against preemption
protects the "federal-state balance" and "operationalizes the political and procedural
safeguards of federalism"); BRADFORD R. CLARK, PROCESS-BASED PREEMPTION, IN
PREEMPTION

CHOICE:

THE

THEORY,

LAW AND

REALITY

OF

FEDERALISM'S

CORE

QUESTIONS 192, 199-201 (William W. Buzbee ed., Cambridge University Press 2009);
William N. Eskridge, Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1485
(2008) ("[T]he larger project of preemption jurisprudence is to develop area-specific
precepts for calibrating the state-federal balance.").
314

See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460-61.

3's

Young, supra note 199, at 261-64.

316

Id. at 257 ("Preemption cases significantly shape our federal balance, and preemption
doctrine has been critically influenced by broader changes in constitutional law."); id. at 265-

71 (describing development of canon as a reaction to expansion of federal authority and

317

possibility that proliferating federal legislation would inadvertently supplant state
regulation).
Id. at 265 ("By requiring Congress to speak clearly in order to preempt state law, Rice
ensures notice to legislative advocates of state interest that preemption is contemplated in

proposed legislation, and it imposes an additional procedural hurdle to legislation that
undermines state prerogatives. Like other 'clear statement rules' disfavoring legislation
that alters the federal-state balance, the Rice presumption operationalizes the political and

procedural safeguards of federalism."); see Bradford R. Clark, The ProceduralSafeguards of
Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1681, 1702, 1709 (2008) (describing various canons
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Parker, of course, preceded the Court's earliest articulation of the antipreemption canon and thus did not invoke it. Moreover, so far as this author
is aware, none of Parke's progeny has invoked this canon, perhaps because
these decisions almost always frame the question as involving possible
immunity from the Sherman Act instead of potential preemption. However,
the Court has invoked the canon to buttress its rejection of preemption in a
different antitrust context.
In Ca/fornia v. ARC America, several states
invoked their antitrust laws to redress injuries they had suffered as "indirect
purchasers" from an interstate cartel. 3 18 Recent Supreme Court precedent
barred indirect purchasers from seeking recovery under the Sherman Act,
holding that only direct purchasers could obtain antitrust damages. 319 The
various states' own antitrust laws, however, expressly authorized such suits,
raising the prospect of parallel actions brought in state and federal court, the
former by direct and indirect purchasers and the latter by direct purchasers
only.3 2 o
The defendants sought Sherman Act preemption of state-law indirect
purchaser suits. Allowing such suits, they said, would frustrate the policy
considerations that induced the Supreme Court to declare such actions off
limits under the Sherman Act. 32 1 After articulating the general standards
governing preemption, the Court proceeded to increase the defendants'
burden of establishing preemption before proceeding to its analysis.
According to the Court:
In this case, in addition, appellees must overcome the
presumption against finding preemption of state law in areas
traditionally regulated by the States. When Congress legislates in
a field traditionally occupied by the States, we start with the

of statutory construction that constitute such safeguards); id. at 1707 (endorsing the
presumption against preemption because "[i]f state law is background law and the federal
government can make 'the supreme Law of the Land' only by employing procedures that
favor small states, then courts are right to apply doctrines that guard against overpreemption of state law. The traditional presumption against preemption performs this
function by ensuring compliance with constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures.
If a federal statute does not expressly preempt state law, then a judicial decision to
preempt risks circumventing the procedural safeguards of federalism built into the
Constitution.").

318
319

See

California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 93 (1989).
Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 734-35 (1977) (holding that private recovery under

320

the antitrust laws is generally limited to direct purchasers).
See ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 98 & n.3 (describing state antitrust laws authorizing
indirect purchaser suits).

321

Id. at 99 (describing defendants' argument to this effect); Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 730-36
(identifying rationales for barring indirect purchaser actions).
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assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress. 322
Applying this standard to the question before it, the Court purported to
identify "a long history of state common law and statutory remedies against
monopolies and unfair business practices," concluding that "it is plain that
this is an area traditionally regulated by the States." 323 The Court found no
"clear purpose" of Congress to thwart indirect purchaser actions brought
under state statutes, even though such actions attacked identical conduct to
that banned by the Sherman Act.3 2 4
2. Applicaton of the Anti-Preemption Canon in Parker
Of course, the statute in Parker did not purport to constitute antitrust
regulation. Instead, Parkerand its progeny have shielded various regulations
that displaced free competition, the goal of antitrust. Still, application of the
anti-preemption canon does not turn on the competitive impact of the
challenged state enactment and could theoretically protect anticompetitive
state legislation from Sherman Act preemption. 32 s
However, some reflection reveals that the anti-preemption canon has no
place with respect to restraints such as those that Parker sustained. While the
Parker restraints regulated local activity, they differed from state legislation
sheltered by the anti-preemption canon in one critical respect: California's
scheme to reduce national raisin output produced substantial interstate harm
by regulating the price of interstate raisin sales, affecting interstate commerce
"directly" and thus regulating such commerce "in a constitutional sense." 326
Such regulation fell within the exclusive authority of Congress under the preWickard understanding of the Commerce power.327 Thus, California's scheme

322
323

ARCAm. Corp., 490 U.S. at 101 (emphases added) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
See id. ("Given the long history of state common law and statutory remedies against
monopolies and unfair business practices, it is plain that this is an area traditionally

regulated by the States."); id. at 102 ("Congress intended the federal antitrust laws to
324

32s
326
327

supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies.").
Id. at 105 (finding no "clear purpose" by Congress to preempt state law simply because it
imposed higher damages than the Sherman Act).

See generally Bums, supra note 139, at 31-38 (explaining that similar pro-federalism logic
explains both ARCAmerica and Parker).
See supranotes 202-06 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 41-49, 196-210 and accompanying text (describing Nineteenth Century
understanding of the appropriate scope of the commerce power and evolution of that
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did not constitute exercise of "historic police powers" over "an area
traditionally regulated by the states." 328 Instead, this scheme purported to
"regulate" interstate commerce, contrary to the presumed intent of Congress,
which the Court "traditionally" enforced via its quasi-statutory Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. 329
Far from supporting any presumption against
preemption of California's scheme to constrict national raisin output, this
case law in fact exemplfied preemption of analogous state schemes. 330 Such
preemption, of course, performed the same function vis a vis state-imposed
restraints as did the Sherman Act ris a vis private restraints. 331 Thus, the antipreemption canon simply has no place with respect to legislation such as that
33 2
evaluated in Parker.
3. Application ofthe Anti-Preemption Canon to Truly Local Restraints
What, though, about the sort of legislation that state action doctrine
usually protects, namely, state regulation of local activity such as billboards,
dentistry, liquor prices and the like? Unlike the regulatory scheme in Parker,

328
329

330

authority to reach intrastate activities such as manufacturing and agriculture and
regulations thereof that directly burdened interstate commerce).
See ARCAmerica, 490 U.S. at 101.
In the same way, it should be noted, pre-Wickard Commerce Clause jurisprudence
preempted state antitrust regulation of conduct that imposed direct burdens on interstate
commerce. See May, supra note 287, at 518 ("Federal and state jurists often declared that
the states could not constitutionally regulate anticompetitive activity within interstate
commerce, . . . [establishing some significant limitations on the scope of state antitrust
provisions. .. . ") (alteration in original); id. at n.117 (collecting decisions).
Cf Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 128 (characterizing Dormant
Commerce Clause as potentially "preempting" state laws that interfered with the free flow
of interstate commerce); supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text (collecting other
authorities to this effect).

331

See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 230 (1899) (explaining that
Congress had the power to ban private restraints that produced the same economic
impact as state-imposed restraints); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180

(1911) (Congress enacted the Sherman Act to protect free movement of trade in the
332

channels of interstate commerce).
See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106-09 (2000) (rejecting anti-preemption canon

where state law purported to exercise authority traditionally exercised by the national
government). Compare Alan J. Meese, Federalism and State Restraints of Interstate Commerce,
100 IOwA L. REV. 2161, 2166 (2015) ("[T]he principle of federalism, properly understood,
does not countenance state legislation enriching in-state producers at the expense of out-

of-state consumers.") (citing Hovenkamp, Federaism and Antitrust Reform, 40 U. OF S. F. L.
REV. at 644)), with Squire, supranote 100, at 119-122 (advocating more robust preemption
standard but endorsing Parkerbecause California scheme sought "fair" prices instead of

monopoly), and

id.

at 121 n.196 (recognizing that proposed standard was "under-

inclusive" because "most buyers of Califomia raisins lived outside the state").
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such regulations produce no interstate harm. Such legislation was beyond
Congressional authority before Wickard and thus survived the Court's preWickard doctrine of quasi-statutory implied preemption. This regulation of
local subjects does exercise "historic police powers in areas traditionally
regulated by the states," with the result that the anti-preemption canon would
seem to counsel against Sherman Act preemption. 333
As noted earlier, some proponents of state action immunity have invoked
the post- Wickard expansion of the Sherman Act to bolster their claim that,
but for the state action doctrine, applying the Act to state-imposed restraints
would grant federal courts undue authority over state regulation of local
activities. 334 This argument certainly has some force as a normative matter.
Moreover, the observation may help explain the Court's reluctance to apply
the Sherman Act to state-imposed restraints, given that so many such
restraints implicate purely local commerce. 335 Application of the Act to such
restraints would in many cases entail judicial inquiry into the reasonableness
of state police power regulation that apparently interferes with free
competition. 336
There is, however, no warrant for application of the anti-preemption
canon in this context. To be sure, there is no indication that Congress
contemplated or anticipated preemption of local state-imposed restraints that
impact interstate commerce indirectly and produce no interstate harm, let
alone any evidence that Congress clearly meant to do so. This does not
establish, however, that Congress declined to preempt state-imposed
restraints as such.
The ultimate touchstone of any such analysis is the meaning that
Congress attributed to the relevant statutory terms. 337 It seems doubtful that
Congress meant to accord state-imposed restraints as such some special
immunity from preemption otherwise dictated by the Court's jurisprudence.
The 1890 Congress presumably knew that the Supreme Court's quasistatutory regime derived from the Commerce Clause preempted state333

See Califomia v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989).
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See supra notes 142-145 and accompanying text.
See supra note 305 and accompanying text (explaining that most decisions on Parker
immunity involve local restraints); cf Easterbrook, supra note 57, at 41 (noting that vast
majority of state-imposed restraints exceed scope of the Sherman Act as originally

33s

understood).
336

337

See Verkuil, supra note 139, at 334 (contending that application of Sherman Act to local
regulations would replicate Lochner-era supervision of local regulation under the Due
Process Clause).
See John Manning, What Divides Textualistsfrom Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. RFv. 70, 82-84
(2006) (explaining how textualists employ canons to "impute meaning to a statute").
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imposed restraints-such as those later assessed in Parker-that regulated
interstate commerce.
This jurisprudence, the Court said, implemented
Congress's presumed intent that the national market remain free of such
obstructions to interstate trade.3 38 Nothing in the Sherman Act indicates that
Congress meant to authorize such restraints and thus rebut this
presumption.3 39 Thus, if Congress did not anticipate banning state-imposed
indirect restraints, it was because it did not anticipate banning any indirect
restraints. Moreover, the immunity that local state-imposed restraints enjoyed
was not immunity from preemption qua preemption, but instead immunity
from the application of the Sherman Act to indirect restraints in the first
place.
Such restraints-whether public or private-simply exceeded the
scope of the commerce power and therefore any imagined scope of the
Sherman Act.
Here again, application of the anti-preemption canon to shield local stateimposed restraints solves a putative problem that the Court itself created
when it ignored the federal-state balance canon and applied the Sherman Act
to local private restraints producing no interstate harm.
To be sure,
immunizing state-imposed restraints to that extent effectuates Congress's
subjective intent, but only accidentally and selectively. Under current law, at
least this result co-exists with two others that contradict that very same intent:
(1) preemption of hybrid, indirect restraints that states have approved but
without satisfying state action doctrine's procedural requirements and (2)
invalidation of innumerable private restraints that also produce no interstate
harm. As explained earlier, the presumption against preemption is simply one
manifestation of a broader judicial commitment to maintaining the federalstate balance.3 0 The principle of federalism that informs the anti-preemption
canon-protection of traditional state regulatory spheres from inadvertent
national interference-requires the same presumption against applying the
Sherman Act to both hybrid and private restraints that produce no interstate
harm.
As was the case with the federal-state balance canon, it would seem that
federalism should be an all-or-nothing proposition. That is, there is no
apparent rationale for ignoring the federal-state balance canon when it comes
to private restraints and thus radically transforming the statutory objective
imputed to Congress, while simultaneously invoking the anti-preemption
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See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
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See supra note

198 and accompanying text (collecting authorities establishing that Congress

could authorize states to regulate interstate commerce).
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See supra notes 313-17 and accompanying text.
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canon to protect state-imposed restraints from the very same fate. Consistent
regard for federalism requires consistent treatment of contracts "in restraint
of trade" and state-imposed restraints that produce the same results. There
are two possible ways to achieve such consistency: (1) invalidation of all such
local restraints, public or private, "across the board," 34 1 or (2) reducing the
scope of the Sherman Act, so that the Act only reaches those restraints that
produce interstate harm.
VI. WHICH CONSISTENCY?
Recognition that the Court's Sherman Act jurisprudence reflects
inconsistent regard for federalism does not itself reveal which consistent
approach the Court should take. Nor does the invocation of the generalized
value of federalism. Finally, considerations of stare decisis do not militate in
favor of either approach, as either approach would require the Court to
overrule numerous decisions. 3 42
Several considerations suggest that the Court should resolve the modern
inconsistency in favor of federalism. The resulting regime would restore the
pre- Wickard allocation of regulatory authority over trade restraints between
states and the national government. The Sherman Act would thus reach only
those restraints, including state-imposed restraints, that directly burden
interstate commerce. Instead of interfering with valid state prerogatives,
preemption in this narrow context would fortify the traditional federal-state
balance by restoring Congress's exclusive authority over conduct or regulation
thereof that produces interstate harm.
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One scholar advocated something like this former approach, without considering
reduction in the scope of the Act across the Board so as not to reach local restraints. See
Squire, supra note 100, at 111-29 (advocating somewhat more robust preemption than

342

recognized under current law but endorsing Parker).
For instance, consistent protection of the traditional federal-state balance would require
the Court to overrule Mandeville Island Farms and the numerous other decisions applying
the Sherman Act to local restraints that merely "substantially affect" interstate commerce.
On the other hand, consistent rejection of federalism canons would require the Court to
overrule Parkerand other decisions that have conferred state action immunity on stateimposed restraints. It should be noted that the Court's inconsistent invocation of
federalism considerations weakens any claim that stare dec/sis requires adherence to Parker
and its progeny. See Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53-57 (1977)
(inconsistent treatment of similar phenomena justifies reconsideration of Sherman Act
precedent); f Squire, supra note 100, at 100 (contending that other aspects of state action

doctrine are "recipes for confusion and indeterminacy" and thus not deserving of stare
dec/sis protection).
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The resulting increase in exclusive state authority would reinforce and
extend states' historic role as "laboratories of democracy" that generate
innovative and diverse solutions to varied local economic problems. Such
"freedom of action" over local economic matters would include the power to
adopt less intrusive regulation-indeed, no regulation at all-of private
conduct currently governed by a one-size-fits-all national floor imposed under
the Sherman Act. Such complete flexibility in regulatory options would help
satisfy the conditions necessary for effective interjurisdictional rivalry and
resulting legislative choices. 3 43
Indeed, proponents of Parker should applaud such a restoration of the
traditional federal-state balance in the antitrust context. These scholars decry
Sherman Act preemption of state regulation of local economic subjects. To
be sure, the sort of restoration advocated here would result in some
preemption of restraints, such as those in Parke, that produce interstate
economic harm. However, the same restoration would eliminate preemption
of what is probably a far larger category of restraints, namely, those hybrid
restraints that states impose without satisfying the requisite procedural
requirements. 3 44 All and all, then, a consistent vindication of federalism
would result in fewer conflicts between state law and the Sherman Act and
less preemption than the current regime.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, consistent retraction of the scope
of the Sherman Act would most closely replicate the regulatory regime that
the enacting Congress anticipated. When Congress passed the Sherman Act,
a quasi-statutory regime imputed to Congress the intent to preempt state
legislation that, like the Parker restraints, directly burdened interstate
commerce. The Supreme Court initially (and properly) read the Sherman Act
to accomplish the same objective (but no more), with respect to private
restraints.
Post-Wickard, the Court abandoned the regime of implied
preemption that had been in place alongside the Sherman Act for over fifty
years, leaving states free to impose direct burdens on interstate commerce.
Restoring the direct/indirect standard to govern the scope of the Sherman
Act and rejecting state action immunity for state-imposed restraints that
directly burden interstate commerce would thus respect the 1890 Congress's
normative choice, reflected in the regime of implied preemption and the
Sherman Act, to guarantee that interstate commerce is "free and
untrammeled," regardless of the source of the threat to free competition.
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competitive federalism including that states can "select any set of laws they desire").
See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.

Easterbrook, supra note 147, at 937 (describing conditions necessary to effective

